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THE HUMAN CAPITAL ERA
INTRODUCTION

As U.S. corporations face intensifying global competition,
American labor relations are undergoing a historic transformation.'
Increasingly, many U.S. managers are seeking a competitive edge by
changing their traditionally adversarial relationship with labor. Instead, firms are attempting to reshape their corporate cultures to
foster the high-trust work relations necessary to support changing
methods of work organization. Firms are responding to international market demands by moving away from hierarchical production processes that involve narrow job assignments and close
supervision. Firms have implemented participatory work programs
that encourage workers to engage in problem-solving and dialogue
concerning production inefficiencies. Industrial relations experts
maintain that these innovative shopfloor practices usually improve
employee attitudes in the short-run and thus lead to temporary increases in productivity. Preserving a cooperative workplace atmosphere, however, has proven to be a more difficult task. 2
At the same time that firms struggle to promote worker commitment and morale on the shopfloor, market pressures frequently
require directors to revise strategies involving production processes
and plant locations in ways that adversely impact the employees'
welfare by threatening job security. Because workers have no right
to influence these decisions through the traditional collective bargaining process, they have no guarantee that directors will weigh
their concerns when formulating strategic corporate policies. Thus,
the existing paradigm of the employees' role in the corporate structure reveals an internal contradiction: cooperative innovations on
the shopfloor have not been supplemented by corresponding policies at the higher levels of corporate planning involving collective
bargaining and board decisionmaking.
This inconsistency raises the issue whether the traditional system of corporate governance can accommodate the challenges of
international competition. Most of the corporate scholars addressing this question concentrate upon reforming the federal securities
laws to remove legal impediments that prevent institutional shareholders from exercising their power.3 This seems to be a step in the
1 For further discussion of how firms are changing production processes to meet
changing market demands, see PETER B. DOERINGER, TURBULENCE IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (1991); THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986); MICHAELJ. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984); ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT
AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983).
2
KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 110.
3

For a discussion of the role of institutional shareholders, see ROBERT MONKS &

NELL MINOW, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY

(1991); Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity
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right direction. Yet, this focus upon financial capital is too narrow
because it ignores one of the most significant factors of competitiveness in global markets-the role of human capital. Corporate scholars must join labor scholars in rethinking traditional solutions to
corporate governance in order to accommodate the changing role
of employees in the corporate structure. Many European countries
have a long history of recognizing the employees' voice in corporate
governance. The time has come to reshape conventional corporate
law discourse in the United States to encompass employees as members of the firm.
In this Article, I focus on expanding the existing fiduciary duties of directors to encompass obligations to employees. This raises
profound political questions about reforming corporate law to regulate the employment relationship. Entering this debate requires
choices about the types of analytical tools that will promote dialogue
concerning the fiduciary duties of directors. When Professors Berle
and Dodd examined this topic over fifty years ago,4 the law and economics movement did not exist. Although efficiency analysis cannot
provide definitive answers, economic models can enlighten policy
discussion when used with a normative vision about the kinds of relationships the law should encourage. This Article maintains that
legal reform requiring labor participation in corporate governance
is necessary not only to achieve social goals concerning industrial
democracy but also to promote efficient corporate behavior in a
changing world economy. 5
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990);John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The

InstitutionalInvestor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?,22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117 (1988). Corporate scholars are beginning to look at corporate governance as a means to foster efficient

production. Ronald Gilson & Mark Roe, Understanding theJapaneseKeiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and IndustrialOrganization, 102 YALE L. J. 871 (1993).
4 For the exchange between Professors Berle and Dodd, see Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
CorporatePowers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is
Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciay Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?,2 U. CHI. L.
REv. 194 (1935); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARv. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
5 Academics and practitioners should strive to use new perspectives to reconceptualize the corporation that protects the noncontractual expectations of employees. These
perspectives include critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory. In my view, given the current economic climate, questions of efficiency must be
considered in discussing the employees' role in the firm. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agendafor Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1,
7 (1988) ("Efficiency is simply too important a matter to be left to management.") [hereinafter Klare, Agenda]; see also Karl E. Klare, The Labor Management Cooperation Debate: A
Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 39 (1988) (arguing that concerns about equity and self-realization cannot eliminate attention to efficiency) [hereinafter Klare, Debate].
The stakeholder debate has prompted corporate scholars to search for different
perspectives from which to analyze corporate law. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable
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As a first step, Part I seeks to reinforce this position at what has
been its weakest point-vulnerability to prevailing economic theories. Part I uses the transaction cost model of the firm to examine
innovative shopfloor practices. This analysis reveals that participatory work programs require workers to invest in firm-specific
skills in an environment of increasing employment insecurity.
Given these additional transactional hazards, the transaction cost
model demonstrates that the traditional collective bargaining solution is insufficient both for raising worker morale to increase productivity and for influencing strategic decisions that impact
employee interests. This part concludes that this model is limited in
its ability to explain the most important aspects of new work organization methods. The theory presents the firm as a hierarchical
structure designed to prevent shirking. This perspective is too narrow because it fails to address the problem of creating corporate
cultures that foster creative and productive behavior.

Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multiplayer Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990) (using
game theory to analyze stakeholder issues); Lymon Johnson, Individualand Collective Sovereignty in the CorporateEnterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 2215 (1992) (urging corporate scholars to broaden their views by incorporating sociology). Other corporate scholars have
encompassed critical legal studies perspectives in corporate scholarship. See, e.g.,
Thomas L. Hazen, The CorporatePersona, Contract(and Market) Failure,and Moral Values, 69
N.C. L. REV. 273, 317-18 (1991) (discussing the need to incorporate critical legal studies
and feminist scholarship into the nexus of contracts model of the firm); LymanJohnson,
The DelawareJudiciary and the Meaning of CorporateLife and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV.
865, 884 (1990) (asserting that "[w]hile corporate law generally has escaped the critical
legal studies movement, the takeover debate [may] take on the polarizing overtones of
pitting the privileged against the unprivileged."); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 251 ("Critical scholars ...have not done nearly enough to apply
their theoretical insights to important practical problems."). For the most part, critical
legal studies scholars have not used their tools of deconstruction in the corporate law
area. For a critical legal studies perspective of corporate law, see Gerald E. Frug, The
Ideology of Bureaucracyin American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1984) (concentrating on
the shareholders' relationship with the corporation); William Simon, Contract Versus Politics in CorporateDoctrine, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 387 (David Kairys ed., 1990) (discussing
the employees's and the local community's role in the firm); Charles Watts, A Race in
the Corporate Bastion-A Case in Point (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(using critical race theory to argue for reforms to diversify upper-level management).
Although feminist scholars have not written widely about corporate law, relational feminism that emphasizes connection and community rather than the narrow pursuit of selfinterest offers an important insight into new corporate cultures. For an overview of this
work, see CAROL GiLLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1988); Robin West,Jurisprdenceand
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
Adolf Berle's references to Catholic social thought also provide a refreshingly different analysis of the employees' role in the corporate structure. Berle uses religious
metaphors to reconceptualize the manager's role as a disinterested public servant. See,
e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE TwENTIEm CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1955); see
also Thomas Kohler, Lessons From the Social Charter: State CorporateLaw and the Meaningof
Subsidiary, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. (forthcoming 1993) (describing how Catholic social
thought influences the Social Charter in Europe).
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Part II uses game-theory models and industrial relations theories to examine the tensions and conflicts that arise from maintaining employee commitment to participatory work programs. This
part recognizes that the traditional system of corporate governance
provides inadequate protection against the expropriation of firmspecific human capital investments and emphasizes that this makes
employees reluctant to accept innovations and disclose information
that may decrease employment stability. This part then argues that
this lack of protection may jeopardize the long-term success of the
new shopfloor practices because workers may respond by reducing
effort norms and withdrawing cooperation from the workplace.
Part III builds upon this foundation to consider the implications that the emerging form of labor relations has for issues concerning corporate governance. This part maintains that worker
representation on corporate boards is necessary to protect employees' firm-specific investments and to facilitate an atmosphere conducive to a high level of employee trust in volatile economic
conditions. This part also asserts that legal intervention is required
to implement these changes because the traditional regime of shareholder supremacy and adversarial labor relations discourage individual firms from voluntarily undertaking these internally efficient
reorganizations.
Part IV seeks to translate these economic paradigms into a new
model of corporate governance entitled the "neutral referee
model." Under this proposal, directors would serve as neutral
referees to balance the competing interests of shareholders and employees. Directors would owe fiduciary obligations to employees,
including the duty to provide information and consult with them
about strategic decisions that affect job security and working conditions. In order to facilitate employee efforts to exercise these proposed rights, this part also includes a proposal for Employee
Participation Committees modeled upon the German system of
works councils. This Article concludes that the neutral referee
model would significantly promote efforts to foster labor-management cooperation and meet the demands of international
competition.
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I
THE EMPLOYEES' ROLE IN THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE:
PARADIGMS IN TRANSITION

The Transaction Cost Model of the Firm and the
Employment Relationship

A.
1.

Work Organizationand Corporate Governance

The prevailing economic paradigm of the firm, the "nexus of
contracts" theory, views the firm as a bundle of implicit and explicit
contractual relationships among shareholders, managers, employees, suppliers, the local community, and others. 6 Oliver Williamson
has significantly contributed to this theory by incorporating two assumptions about human behavior. The first assumption, known as
"bounded rationality," emphasizes that parties entering into complex, long-term business relationships cannot foresee every possible
contingency. 7 The second assumption, known as "opportunism,"
focuses on the possibility that one party may attempt to appropriate
gains from the transaction at the other's expense. Vulnerability to
opportunism increases when parties make transaction-specific investments, because they cannot exit from the contract without
forfeiting these investments. Given these transactual barriers, explicit contractual safeguards are often inadequate to govern the parties' relationship; the initial risk distribution process usually
requires adjustments to accommodate subsequent events. Thus, the
parties leave terms open and attempt to signal their willingness to
cooperate in the future by consenting to structures and procedures
that will govern their ongoing transactions. 8 In designing these
processes, the parties seek to realign their incentives so that the
promise to act fairly in the future is self-enforcing. Devising such
processes, however, becomes more difficult as the number of transaction-specific investments and the amount of uncertainty increase. 9
6 This theory builds upon Ronald Coase's seminal theory of firms as cost-efficient
alternatives to market transactions. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONoMICA 386 (1937). For a critical evaluation of this theory's influence on corporate
law, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A CriticalAppraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989).
7 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21-26 (1975) (discussing bounded rationality and
uncertainty/complexity).
8 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
163-205 (1985) (discussing how parties attempt to foster trust by giving credible commitments) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM); see also Oliver E. Williamson, Credible

Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 83 AM. EcON. REV. 519 (1983) (same)
[hereinafter Williamson, Credible Commitments].
9 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 52-56.
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Williamson uses this transaction cost approach to explain how
production is organized within the firm.' 0 He asserts that managers
and workers agree to delegate power to management over certain
issues referred to as the "zones of acceptance."" This delegation
occurs because hierarchical production processes have four efficiency advantages over "peer group" shopfloor practices that involve a higher degree of team effort and worker consultation. First,
Williamson suggests that centralized planning under the hierarchical approach reduces the expense involved in organizing day-to-day
operations in comparison to peer group methods that seek employee suggestions about changes in production processes.' 2 Second, by avoiding the need for employee consent under the peer
group method, Williamson asserts that the hierarchical approach
provides more flexibility and less uncertainty when it is necessary to
adapt production processes to changing market conditions.13
Third, Williamson maintains that the hierarchical structure achieves
greater efficiency by permitting managers to specialize as monitors
to prevent shirking. In contrast, the peer group system creates
greater incentives for each team member to shirk because the individual member's input has only a small impact on output.1 4 Fourth,
Williamson maintains that the "command and control" arrangement under the hierarchical system reduces many of the opportunities for strategic bargaining between managers and employees
provided under the peer group method.' 5 Therefore, Williamson
argues, the dominance of hierarchical shopfloor methods over more
participatory models can be explained in terms of lower transaction
costs.
Transaction cost economics sheds further light on the nature of
the firm by exploring an issue related to work organization-the
structure of corporate governance. 16 Under Williamson's model,
the firm internalizes transactions characterized by high asset specificity and uncertainty through corporate governance systems.
10 Id. at 155-75.
11 Id. at 249 (Hierarchical arrangement provides that management orders concerning these dimensions of production will be implemented without resistance.); see also
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (Firm hierarchy arises
from delegations of power by firm participants acting to reduce transaction costs.).
12 WILLAMSON, supra note 7, at 45-47.
13 Id. at 47.
14 Id. at 53-54. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz first highlighted the measurement problems that arise when teams of workers cooperate to produce goods. Armen
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
15 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 71.
16 Id. at 29, 211 (discussing how measurement problem that occurs in designing
work organization is related to issues concerning corporate governance).
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Board representation protects firm-specific investments by providing an opportunity to monitor and participate in management of the
firm. Williamson asserts that the nature of shareholders' investments requires this type of safeguard because other contractual protections are inadequate. 17 In contrast, Williamson assumes that the
employee's investments involve lower asset-specificity and uncertainty, and collective bargaining agreements are sufficient to safeguard their concerns.' 8 Williamson recognizes that bounded
rationality and opportunism prevent managers and employees from
fully protecting their interests through collective bargaining.
Therefore, Williamson suggests that the parties develop additional
procedural safeguards referred to as "internal labor markets."' 19 In
general, internal labor markets involve human resource policies
concerning job security, training, and job design that impact how
production is organized on the shopfloor. 20
2.

Internal Labor Markets, Firm-SpecificInvestments, and
Opportunism

Questions regarding the employees' role in the corporate structure are not appropriate if the employment relationship merely
consists of workers exchanging a certain amount of labor for specific
market-determined wages. But this is not the case. One-fourth of
the total workforce and over half of the male workforce remain at
the same firm for at least twenty years. 2 1 Labor economists theorize
Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984).
Id. at 1207-09 (collective bargaining may substitute for labor representation on
the board). Katherine Stone criticized Williamson for failing to recognize how the privatized system of collective bargaining that has arisen under the National Labor Relations
Act fails to protect labor from the adverse corporate decisions. Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Labor and the CorporateStructure: Changing Conceptions and EmergingPossibilities,55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73, 158 (1988). Williamson does, however, leave open the possibility of
labor representation on the corporate board for informational purposes when the academic environment is characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. Williamson, supra
note 17, at 1209.
Williamson assumes that workers with general purpose skills do not need specific
protection because they can easily find employment elsewhere. Id. at 1207 ("Such workers can quit and be replaced without productive loss to either the workers or the firm.").
Williamson nonetheless recognizes to some extent the harsh consequences faced by displaced workers. Id. at 1207 n.31. ("We may want to create some barriers to deter termination without cause and reduce transition costs.")
19
Oliver E. Williamson,. Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 257 (1979). Williamson suggests that unionization facilitates the development of internal labor markets, but that it is not necessary for these
markets to operate successfully. WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 75-76.
20 See PAUL OSTERMAN,EMPLOYMENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION,DISLOCATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 60-67 (1988).
21
Robert E. Hall, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 716, 724 (1982); see also John T. Addison & Albert C. Castro, The Importance of
Lifetime Jobs: Differences Between Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
17
18
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that large corporations develop internal labor markets that encourage employees to develop long-term attachments to their
firms.2 2 In general, the parties understand that in exchange for an
employee's lifetime contribution, the firm will provide a degree of
'23
job security. This arrangement involves an "invisible handshake.
Although the agreement is not legally enforceable, the parties act
"as if" a contract exists.
Firms and workers internalize the employment relationship because external market relationships are inadequate for two reasons.
First, external labor markets are not conducive to making investments in human capital. Firms are reluctant to provide training unless they have some assurance that employees will stay with the firm
long enough to recoup the returns from the investments. Internal
labor markets facilitate firm investments in training by requiring employees to bear part of the expense of acquiring human capital in
their junior years. 24 That is, firms pay workers wage rates less than
their marginal product in their early years and more than their marginal product in their later years. By deferring compensation, internal labor markets provide an incentive for employees to remain with
25
the firm.
Second, under external market arrangements, firms incur high
monitoring costs to reduce shirking because employees tend to perform only according to minimally acceptable standards concerning
the quality and quantity of work effort. 26 Using Williamson's terms,
external market arrangements produce "perfunctory cooperation"
393, 402 (1987) (noting that union workers enjoy a slightly higher tenure, which may be
attributable to an informational advantage).
22
Labor economists first use the implicit employment theory to explain the wage
rigidity in contemporary labor markets. Three early contributors to the implicit employment contract literature are Costas Azariadis, Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1183 (1975); Martin Baily, Wages and Employment Under Uncertain
Demand, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 37 (1974); Donald F. Gordon, A NeoclassicalTheory of Keynesian Unemployment, 12 ECoN. INQUIRY 431 (1974). For an overview of internal labor markets, see, e.g., PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAELJ. PIORE, INTERNATIONAL LABOR MARKETS
AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1985); RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT SMrrH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 421-27 (3d ed. 1988).

23

See Arthur M. Okun, The Invisible Handshake and the Inflationay Process, 22 GHAL-

LENGE 5 (1980).
24
WILLIAMSON,

supra note 7, at 62-63. Employees are reluctant to bear the expense
of acquiring firm-specific human capital because these investments may lose value when
the employees lose theirjobs. Firm-specific investments in human capital pose the danger that once employees receive firm-specific training, they will "hoard information to
their personal advantage." Id. at 63. This contracting problem, referred to as "informational asymmetry," intensifies as the degree of asset specificity increases. Id. at 63-64.
25 Id.
26
Whereas firms tend to be risk-neutral, workers are relatively risk-averse because
they face harsh consequences from unemployment if their firm suffers a temporary fluctuation in demand for their labor. Through implicit contracts, firms smooth the workers' income flows through wage rigidity and long-term employment. See Costas
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but not "consummate cooperation." 27 In other words, these arrangements induce compliance with work rules but do not lend to
additional effort or initiative. Williamson explains that extensive
monitoring produces a negative workplace atmosphere, with lower
productivity resulting from the "influence of metering intensity on
work attitudes. ' 28 In contrast, internal labor markets attempt to
mitigate these problems by establishing "job ladders." Employees
begin their careers at the bottom of these ladders, referred to as
"ports of entry," and climb to higher levels that are not usually open
to employees in the general labor market. 2 9 This system ofjob ladders encourages consummate cooperation by rewarding dedicated,
long-term employees with seniority benefits in the form of promo30
tions, higher wages, and job security.
Because implicit employment arrangements are not legally
binding contracts, both parties must rely on extra-legal enforcement
mechanisms to ensure that the agreements are fulfilled. Firms deter
opportunistic conduct by requiring employees to post bonds in the
form of uncompensated labor during the early years of service.
These bonds constitute "job market tolls" that the employees must
pay in order to enter a job ladder. 31 These tolls reduce opportunism because employees must surrender these bonds when they quit
or are dismissed for poor performance.3 2 In this way, these job
market tolls tend to lock in the employees' investments in the firm
to ensure that they will perform adequately in the future.
Unfortunately, these extra-legal enforcement mechanisms may
not prevent firms from reneging on their obligations under implicit
labor arrangements. Firms have an incentive to abandon these
agreements and expropriate the workers' share of the firm surplus
represented by the deferred compensation and wages that exceed
Azariadis &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price Equilibria,98 QJ. ECoN. 1
(1983).
27

WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 69.

Id. at 25. Williamson states that the peer group method possesses better sociological attributes, but is inferior to hierarchical alternatives because it fails to assign
workers to their most productive uses. See also Oliver E. Williamson, The Organizationof
28

Work: A ComparativeInstitutionalAssessment,

IJ.

ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 5, 37 (1980) (argu-

ing that nonhierarchial work makes common experience substantial transaction cost
disabilities).
29
30
31

See DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 22, at 42-47.
WILLIAMSON,

supra note 7, at 78.

This term originated in Clark Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor Markets, in LABOR

92 (1954).
In addition, employees must give up social contacts at work and may have to
change residences. See Thomas Eger & Peter Weise, Participationand Codeterminationin a
Perfect and Imperfect World, in CODETERMINATION: A DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENT APMOBILrIY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

32

PROACHES 11, 19 (Hans G. Nutzinger & Jurgen Backhaus eds., 1989) [hereinafter
CODETERMINATION].

910

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:899

marginal productivity for senior workers. In contrast to the implicit
assurances provided by their workers, firms do not bond their performance to employees by providing the financial equivalent of job
market tolls. Labor economists explain that these bonds by firms
might take the form of severance payments when permanent job
loss results from bankruptcy, supply and demand shifts, and product
obsolescence.3 3 Most firms, however, do not provide severance payments in amounts sufficient to compensate employees for firm-specific investments. 3 4 To a certain extent, employers indirectly bond
their performance to employees when they invest in immobile and
35
unsalvageable plant and equipment.
For the most part, employees are left to rely upon a firm's reputation for upholding implicit employment agreements. Firms that
fail to honor these obligations will acquire dishonorable reputations
that will impede efforts to attract and retain the most qualified workers. Thus, these reputational sanctions operate both outside the
firm in the external labor market and within the firm among the existing employees. In the general labor market, one would presume
that the breach of implicit employment agreements would adversely
affect a firm's ability to compete for the most productive employees.
Yet many labor economists believe that this deterrent is weak because information regarding a firm's untrustworthiness is not sufficiently transmitted throughout the labor market.3 6 A second feature
of the reputational sanction has a more substantial effect. Although
most employees are hired on an at-will basis, few employers arbitrarily dismiss workers. Employers value the appearance of an equitable personnel system, which is needed to maintain the morale,
33

See Sherwin Rosen, Implicit Contracts: A Survey, 23 J. ECON. Lrr. 1144, 1170-71

(1985).
34 See Robert E. Hall & Edward P. Lazear, The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to
Demand, 2 J. LAB. ECON. 233, 250 (1984) (Because firm has monopsony power, some
degree of severance pay is desirable to offset that power.). Attempting to explain why
corporations often fail to provide severance payments, economists surmise that "the
temptation for the firm to renege on promised severance payments may be irresistible."
Larry Samuelson, Implicit Contracts with Heterogenous Labor, 3J. LAB. ECON. 70, 87 (1985)
(Implicit contract models often allow firms to make severance payments "presumably
because of the optimality of doing so."). In defending employment-at-will, Richard Epstein recognizes that severance pay has advantages. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. Cmi. L. REv. 947, 967 (1984).
35 In addition, firms individually bond their performance through investments in
the hiring and training of new workers. See Clive Bull, Implicit Contracts in the Absence of
Enforcement and Risk Aversion, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 658, 662-63 (1983); WilliamJ. Carney,
Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 385, 392 (1990).
36 See, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker
Discipline Device, 74 AM. EcoN. REV. 433, 442 (1984) (contending that prospective em-

ployees often do not know the employer's record, and previous dismissals may have
been legitimate).
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productivity, and loyalty of the current workforce.3 7 Although the
firm's interest in maintaining its reputation as a fair employer provides some assurance to employees, significant room for opportunistic conduct by firms remains. Because employees lack adequate
safeguards to prevent the expropriation of their firm-specific investments, the successful operation of an internal labor market within a
firm depends upon the degree that the workforce trusts that management will not renege on its obligations under implicit employment agreements.
B.

Restructuring Internal Labor Markets: Emerging Shopfloor
Practices

During the past twenty years, internal labor markets have been
undergoing a transformation on a world-wide scale as firms respond
to international market pressures by reshaping shopfloor practices. 38 Many corporations have shifted from the conventional bureaucratic form of work organization to more flexible, participatory
work programs. 39 In general, large nonunionized firms employ the
participatory model, while the unionized steel and auto industries
40
have used the hierarchical system.

The traditional system, known as "Taylorism," 41 seeks to maximize productivity by developing a high degree of specialization
among workers. 42 In general, this system separates "thinking" work
from "doing" work in order to develop technical expertise. 43 To
See, e.g., Bull, supra note 35, at 662; Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 26, at 19.
Masahiko Aoki, The ParticipatoryGeneration of Information Rents and the Theory of the
Firm, in THE FIRM AS A NExus OF TREATIES 26, 27 (Masahiko Aoki et al. eds., 1990)
37
38

[hereinafter TREATIES].
39 Eighty percent of the Fortune 1000 companies have implemented some form of

the participating work program. CurrentDevelopments, Daily Lab. Rptr. (BNA) No. 186, at
A-9 (Sept. 27, 1989).
40 See, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
IN THE CHANGING CORPORATIONS 97 (1988) (For the most part, companies implementing

participatory programs seek to avoid unionization, although General Motors and Ford
are notable exceptions.).
41 These shopfloor practices began in the early twentieth century when industrial
engineer Frederick W. Taylor devised the method of production referred to as "scientific management." FREDERICK TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911). For a detailed historical account of Taylorism, see DANIEL NELSON, FREDERICK
W. TAYLOR AND THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1980).
42 TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 32; see also HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR AND MONOPOLY
CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 126 (1974) ("The
separation of hand and brain is the most decisive single step in the division of labor
taken by the capitalist mode of production.").
43 See, e.g., DAN CLAWSON, BUREAUCRACY AND THE LABOR PROCESS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. INDUSTRY, 1860-1920 202 (1980) (describing Taylor as "the Napoleon of
the war against craft production"); REICH, supra note 1, at 68 ("Planning was to be distinct from execution, brain distinct from brawn, head from hand, white collar from'blue
collar."); Katherine Stone, The Origins ofJob Structures in the Steel Industry, in LABOR MAR-
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accomplish this task, the production process is segmented into independent work assignments involving simple, repetitive motions
that minimize the amount ofjudgment required by workers. Under
Taylorism, decisionmaking takes place through a centralized managerial planning department. 44 The ultimate managerial authority
rests at the top of a pyramid-shaped hierarchy. At the lower levels
of this pyramid, managerial discretion is constrained by rigid work
rules. This hierarchical system stresses the importance of preserving managerial control over the production process by reducing the
firm's dependence upon labor cooperation. To ensure control,
Taylorism employs extensive monitoring based on the assumption
that workers will shirk their duties when given the opportunity. 4 5 In
addition, jobs are defined narrowly so that workers are prevented
from understanding the production process so that they cannot reduce the pace of work and the amount of production. 4 6 In order to
minimize the risk that workers will limit production, Taylorism seeks
to inhibit worker solidarity by using discrete job assignments that
reduce the need for communication between employees. For these
reasons, Taylorism tends to produce an adversarial atmosphere that
47
leads to a low level of employee commitment.
Despite the employee alienation it engenders, Taylorism successfully operated in the stable oligopolistic markets that existed in
the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. 48 During the 1970s,
however, this economic environment changed as global market
pressures reduced the competitiveness of the traditional mass production industries in highly developed economies. 49 Comparative
advantages for firms in industrialized nations have since shifted to
more specialized production methods that are characterized by frequent technological change and shorter product cycles. 50 Taylorism, however, is not well-suited to respond to these developments.
Routinized production processes and fixed job classifications impede firm efforts to respond quickly to new opportunities in a rapidly changing environment. Thus, use of the traditional system in
KET SEGMENTATION 27 (Richard C. Edwards et al. eds., 1975) (employer strategies
designed to gain and maintain control over the work process).
44 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 65; BRAVERMAN, supra note 42, at 136.
45 See, e.g., REICH, supra note 1, at 64.
46 See, e.g., BRAVERMAN, supra note 42, at 125 ("Thus, in the setting of antagonistic
social relations, of alienated labor, hand and brain become not just separated, but divided and hostile, and the human unity of hand and brain turns into its opposite, something less than human.").
47

Id.

48 See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 1, at 165-66.
49 See REICH, supra note 1, at 127.
50 Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of theJapaneseFirm, 28J. ECON. LIT. 1, 4
(1990).
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the United States is gradually declining as firms realize that competing in the global economy requires a high commitment to flexible
51
shopfloor practices.
In redesigning production processes, many firms in the United
States have looked to the Japanese system of industrial relations.
Although the new practices differ widely among individual firms, the
emerging form of work organization generally attempts to raise pro52
ductivity by utilizing rather than suppressing worker knowledge.
Whereas Taylorism tends to stress passive obedience to rigid work
rules, these new programs entrust workers with increasing amounts
of responsibility in the interests of the company. Avoiding the time
delay caused by hierarchical planning, these programs delegate control over production processes to workers on the shopfloor where
useful on-the-spot information is available.53 In contrast to their
narrow job assignments under Taylorism, workers in the emerging
programs learn a variety of skills that allow them to rotate among
positions according to the firm's needs. 54 In this way, these programs develop the worker's problem-solving capabilities by sharing
knowledge on the shopfloor. By avoiding rigid, hierarchical chains
of authority,5 5 participating programs allow firms to respond more
quickly to market signals. 56 Compared to Taylorism, these programs use relatively "flat" organizational structures because autonomous work teams perform many functions previously controlled by
57
managers.
C. Participatory Work Programs and the Transaction Cost
Model of the Firm
The transaction cost model of the firm provides a framework to
understand the implications that the recent changes in shopfloor
practices have for the structure of internal labor markets that operate within firms. Although the transaction cost model provides a
useful analysis of certain features of the emerging methods of work
organization, it contains several drawbacks. Exploring these weaknesses reveals ways in which the prevailing theory of the firm needs
51 Michael Piore and Charles Sabel described the changing shopfloor practice as
"flexible specialization." This is the term given to efforts "[t]o convert the traditional
highly integrated corporate structure into a more supple organizational form capable of
responding quickly to shifting market conditions and product demand." PIORE & SABEL,
supra note 1, at 231-36.
52 Aoki, supra note 38, at 27.
53 Id. at 27; Aoki, supra note 50, at 3.
54 Aoki, supra note 38, at 43.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 27.
57 REICH, supra note 1, at 246.
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to be revised to provide a richer and more complex view of the employees' changing role in the corporate structure.
1. The Efficiency Tradeoffs of Participatory Work Programs
Williamson's vision of the employment relationship parallels
the Taylorist view. In transaction cost terms, Taylorism reduces the
potential for opportunism by preventing workers from developing
an informational advantage concerning operational processes. 5 8 In
addition, Taylorism's strong emphasis upon control ensures that
managers maintain a strategic advantage over production matters.
Williamson maintains that the separation of "thinking" from "doing" achieves efficiencies because "information-processing and decision-making talents are not widely distributed." 59 He builds upon
this assumption to assert that a positive correlation exists between
efficiency and hierarchy. Specifically, Williamson maintains that
"centralization of information handling avoids the need for full
group discussion with little or no sacrifice in the quality of the decision." 60 Williamson, however, recognizes that hierarchial work
structures may have a negative impact on worker incentives and recommends that future research should focus upon issues of em61
ployee dignity and workplace atmosphere.
58
59

Stone, supra note 43, at 19.
Williamson suggests:
What is especially relevant to the choice of peer group or simple hierarchy is that, to the extent that the requisite information-processing
and decision-making talents are not widely distributed, efficiency will be
served by reserving the central information collection and decision-making position to the one or few individuals who have superior information
processing capacities and exceptional oratorical and decision-making
skills. Something of an elite thereby results, as the select set bears an
asymmetrical relation to everyone else.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 52.
60
Id. at 46-47. Williamson states:
[Sluppose that adaptations to changing market circumstances are needed
in order to utilize resources efficiency. While a full group discussion
could be held to determine what adaptation is to be made, this is time
consuming and may yield little gain if-provided only that everyone pulls
in harness-any of a number of adaptations would work.
Id. at 47; see also WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at 231, 239 (correlation between
the degree of hierarchy and efficiency). In response to the claim that hierarchy arises
because of the need to maintain control over workers, Williamson considers hierarchy to
be a generic element of the firm as an alternative to market transactions. He asserts:
"[h]ostility to hierarchy thus lacks a comparative institutional foundation. There may be
more or less preferred types of hierarchy; but hierarchy itself is unavoidable unless efficiency sacrifices are made." Id. at 231.
61 Williamson recognizes that Taylorism creates a calculating atmosphere that leads
employees to perform their jobs in a minimal or "perfunctory" rather than a maximal or
"consummate" fashion. He indicates that participatory programs create a better atmosphere for workplace cooperation because less monitoring increases the workers dignity.
He states that peer group production fosters a better atmosphere because it allows the
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Although Williamson acknowledges that the peer group form of
production provides advantages for the workers' dignity, he expresses great doubt that participatory work programs will achieve
greater productivity. 6 2 At this point, conflicting empirical data prevent a definite conclusion about the efficacy of the new shopfloor
practices. 6 3 Williamson suggests that the positive impact upon atmosphere under participatory programs is outweighed by losses
that result from the reduction in the specialization ofjobs and centralization in decisionmaking.64 When environments for planning
are stable, this may be the case. That is, the information acquired
on the shopfloor may not enhance centralized planning.6 5 Yet, the
opposite situation arises when fluctuating market conditions require
a flexible and creative workplace to respond rapidly to new production processes. Under these conditions, the benefits gained by
greater communication at the shopfloor level under participatory
programs may more than compensate for the loss of skill specialization that results as a consequence of the workers' time spent in ac66
quiring new information.
2.

Transaction Hazards and ParticipatoryWork Practices

Compared to Taylorism, emerging shopfloor practices require
workers to invest in more firm-specific skills by developing their capacity to communicate information about production processes and
adapt to flexible work assignments. Yet, under current market conditions, employees face a great deal of uncertainty when making
these additional investments. Specifically, employees fear that abandoning rigid work rules and sharing information about production
inefficiencies will lead to layoffs. 67 This fear is understandable given
the existing structure of internal labor markets. In stable economic
"transformation of 'involvement' relations, from a calculative to a more nearly
quasimoral mode ..
" WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 44. Williamson also argues that
unless problems of alienation and workers' "dignity" are considered, the conception of
economic organization will be too narrow. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 8, at
271 ("[C]apitalism is prone to undervalue dignity and that institutional safeguards can
sometimes be forged that help to correct the condition.").
62

WILLIAMSON, CAPrrALISM, supra note 8, at 270 ("Participation benefits raises a

serious doubt that efforts to effect participation can be justified on profitability
grounds.").
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 269-70 (discussing conflicting studies).
Id. at 270.

Aoki, supra note 38, at 8-10.
Id.
THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION AND AMERICAN UNIONS:
THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 42, 58-59 (1984) (Employees resist cooperating with innovations in the workplace for fear ofjob loss.) [hereinafter KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION]; KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 119 (new work structures spur employee
interest in job security).
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environments, self-enforcing mechanisms concerning firms' reputations adequately prevent them from breaching implicit employment
agreements. However, the results of highly leveraged, bust-up acquisitions dramatically illustrate the insufficiency of these extra-legal
measures to prevent the expropriation of human capital investments. 68 Reputational concerns are also unlikely to protect employees when a firm leaves a regional labor market and relocates to
another part of the country or world. 69 As the labor market becomes more volatile, long-term employment relationships become
less secure. 70 This instability frustrates attempts to reform shopfloor practices and undermines the essential foundation needed for
the successful operation of internal labor market arrangementsworker trust.
Because participatory programs raise employee concerns about
job security, firms using the new shopfloor practices will either have
to pay workers a wage premium to compensate for this risk or reduce the risk of opportunism. Competitive pressures may foreclose
the option of paying higher wages. Thus, firms will need to develop
transactional safeguards to ensure that employees will receive the
benefits of their firm-specific investments without fear of exploitation. However, the traditional collective bargaining solution fails to
accomplish this task for two reasons. First, collective bargaining will
not induce employees to engage in cooperative efforts to improve
productivity and product quality. This kind of participation simply
cannot be written into detailed, contractual specifications. Second,
as the employment structure becomes more deeply internalized, the
employees' welfare becomes increasingly influenced by strategic decisions involving job security, production processes, and investment
rates. Yet, these issues do not lend themselves to the collective bargaining process. The reason is that neither management nor labor
has perfect foresight; thus, substantial problems of information and
enforcement that arise as a result of bounded rationality and oppor68

Sherwin Rosen, Transaction Costs and Internal Labor Markets, 4 J.L. ECoN. & ORG.

49, 51 (1988) (discussing ex post enforcement problem due to opportunistic breach); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 38 (AlanJ. Auerbach ed., 1988) ("[I]mplicit
contracts specify actions that ex post reduce the firm's value, even though agreeing to
these actions is ex ante value maximizing. Breach of contract can therefore raise shareholder wealth, and the more so the greater is the burden of fulfilling past implicit contracts."). Id. at 38.
69 Shleifer & Summers, supra note 68, at 39 (stating that an employer whose future
reputation is unimportant is likely to breach implicit agreements with employees).
70

See, e.g., BENNETr HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPO-

RATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE POLARIZING OF AMERICA 112-28 (1988) (discussing how

restructuring produces widespread alienation in the workplace); OSTERMAN, supra note

20, at 80 ("[W]orkers generally will feel less secure as they confront an economy in
which more of their neighbors, friends, and relatives are having trouble.").
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tunistic conduct impede efforts to protect employees against every
contingency in explicit contracts. Viewed in this light, collective
bargaining alone is insufficient to meet the needs of contemporary
labor relations in a changing world economy.
Under Williamson's analysis, workers should be granted a role
in corporate governance because participatory work programs require employees to make investments characterized by high asset
specificity and uncertainty. In two respects, however, the transaction cost model fails to analyze the type of relational contracting
that is necessary for participatory work programs to succeed. First,
although Williamson asserts that internal labor markets create a
workplace atmosphere that motivates workers to provide consummate cooperation, 7 1 Williamson never provides a detailed explanation of why this result should occur. Second, Williamson focuses
almost exclusively upon the employers' problems controlling employee opportunism involving shirking. He tends to ignore employees' difficulties concerning firm opportunism, particularly the fact
that internal labor markets fail to prevent the expropriation of workers' firm-specific investments.
To further explore the emerging shopfloor practices, we need
to shift the discussion of implicit employment agreements away
from the traditional goal of preventing shirking and toward the
more pressing problem of developing organizational arrangements
that are best suited to motivate a highly committed workforce to
utilize fully their information-processing and communicative abilities. It is also necessary to focus upon the industrial conflict that
surrounds the implementation of participatory work programs by
analyzing the consequences of opportunistic conduct by both employers and workers. The next part explores these issues by developing a revised economic framework that incorporates literature in
the areas of strategic games, industrial relations, and relational
contracts.
II
PARTICIPATORY WORK PROGRAMS: AN X-EFFICIENCY
PERSPECTIVE

A.

X-efficiency, the Prisoners' Dilemma, and Effort
Conventions

As the concept of the firm is expanded to encompass the employees' changing role, the concept of efficiency needs to be broadened accordingly. Economist Harvey Leibenstein examines the

workers' ability to influence the internal efficiency of the firm's oper71

WILLIAMSON,

supra note 7, at 38-39.
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ations. 7 2 Leibenstein begins with the premise that firms cannot
purchase labor like other factors of production. Although firms buy
worker time, the relevant consideration for productivity is the pace
and quality of the worker effort. 73 To a certain extent, employers
can control these factors by monitoring minimum standards and imposing sanctions for shirking. Above minimum standards, however,
workers have discretion to produce at higher levels. 74 In particular,
monitoring will not ensure that workers reveal information concerning production inefficiencies.7 5 The way the firm treats its employees significantly influences the "X-factor"; that is, how innermotivated workers are to cooperate and produce. Within a certain
range, managers can modify worker incentives through wages and
working conditions. 76 Leibenstein explains that ignoring those
motivational considerations leads to a substantial amount of "Xinefficiency. ' 77 As a result, this theory suggests that productivity
may differ among firms even if the other aspects of production are
78
the same.
To demonstrate the implications of X-inefficiency, Leibenstein
regards productivity as a prisoners' dilemma game played by employees and managers making strategic decisions that are characterized by both conflicting and common goals. 79 Under this game,
workers and managers make basic choices about whether to cooperate or defect in deciding the amount of work effort and the quality of
working conditions. Of course, the optimal solution involves employees choosing to provide the highest level of effort in return for
the best working conditions. Yet, the players face difficulties in
reaching the optimal solution because they cannot credibly commit
to achieve this outcome by using traditional explicit and implicit
contractual safeguards.
72

HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY

32

(1987) [hereinafter

LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM]; HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND EcoNOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR MICROECONOMICS 29 (1976) [hereinafter LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN]. For a comparison of the X-efficiency model and the

transaction cost model, see Louis De Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 64, 76 (1983) (criticizing Leibenstein's
costs);
(1983)
73
74
75
76
77
78

model by asserting that X-inefficiency can be described in terms of transaction
Louis De Alessi, Property Rights and X-Efficiency: A Reply, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 843
(same).
LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 72, at 98-99.
Id. at 98-100; LEiBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 99.
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 101-02.

Id. at 87.
LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 72, at
Id. at 100-01; LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note

46-47, 94.
72, at 104.

79 For an introduction to game theory and the prisoners' dilemma see, e.g., DAVID M.
KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 29-39 (1990); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 27-30 (1979).
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On the one hand, employees face difficulty in giving credible
commitments to provide consummate cooperation because cost
considerations prevent firms from detecting the amount of the
workers' effort. Additionally, heavy monitoring creates a negative
work atmosphere that decreases productivity. Given these limitations, firms could require employees to sacrifice a bond for failing to
perform according to the highest standards. However, this solution
would fail because employees probably lack the resources to provide
these bonds in amounts sufficient to guarantee consummate
cooperation.8 0
Employers also face barriers in providing credible commitments for employment security. A widely accepted notion is that
employers do not offer complete job security because it would cause
employees to shirk.8 ' Yet, this "moral hazard" theory seems odd
because it is unlikely that a firm would ever agree to retain workers
who do not meet minimum performance standards. A better explanation suggests that employers' inability to provide credible commitments arises as a result of the transaction costs involved in
drafting and enforcing contracts for job security. 8 2
Because transaction costs impede efforts to make credible commitments, a party who chooses to cooperate when playing the prisoners' dilemma game has no assurance that the other player will
respond in a similar fashion. If both players cooperate, each receives a higher payoff than if both defect. But if one player defects
while the other cooperates, the defecting player receives the highest
return available, while the cooperating player receives the lowest return possible. Under this game, the dilemma arises because each
player has an opportunity to receive the larger return at the other's
expense by exploiting trusting behavior. Because each player is un80

Roger McCain, Transaction Costs, Labor Management, and Codetermination, 4 AD-

VANCES ECON. ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR MANAGED FIRMS 205, 213 (1992)

(discussing commitment problems); cf. George A. Akerlof & Lawrence F. Katz, Workers'
Trust Funds andthe Logic of Wage Profiles, 104 QJ. ECON. 525 (1989) (during the early years
of service, the amount of the bond may be insufficient to provide much deterrence
against shirking; thus, deferred payment scheme and up-front bonds are not perfect
substitutes); Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KEN" L. REV. 159 ("Real
world employees obviously do not have the resources to post such a bond.").
81 See, e.g.,Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 363; see generally Williamson, Credible
Commitments, supra note 8, at 519-20 (reporting that a mechanism designed to control the
opportunism of one party may well facilitate the opportunism of the other).
82 In drafting tin parachutes, Katherine Stone explains, it is difficult to specify all
the events that would trigger the parachute. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REv. 45, 60-64
(1991). Even if these contracting problems could be overcome, Stone explains that successorship rules prevent unions from enforcing provisions in the event of certain
changes in control. Id. at 64. Enforcement is also impeded because arbitrators are reluctant to grant injunctive relief. Id. at 67.
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certain how the other will behave, distrust leads each player to pursue the strategy that maximizes individual gain while reducing the
risks of opportunism. Under this strategy, each player perceives
that, regardless of whether the other player decides to cooperate or
defect, the decision to defect will produce a higher return than the
decision to cooperate. This type of reasoning leads each player to
defect, producing an inferior outcome for both parties referred to as
the "prisoners' dilemma solution."
Applying this analysis to productivity, Leibenstein explains that
firms have an incentive to increase profits by obtaining the maximum amount of work effort at the lowest cost in terms of working
conditions. Similarly, workers have an incentive to obtain the best
working conditions in return for the lowest amount of effort possible. Under the prisoners' dilemma solution, employees supply the
lowest effort possible, regardless of the motivations provided by
managers. Similarly, managers will provide low motivations, regardless of the effort put forth by employees.8 3 In contrast, if the
parties trust each other to cooperate, it is possible to attain the
"golden rule solution," in which employees provide maximum ef84
fort in return for optimal working conditions and wages.
Leibenstein suggests that the prisoners' dilemma solution
rarely occurs because the parties establish conventions regarding
the appropriate amount of effort and working conditions.8 5 Certain
factors influence these "effort conventions," including the motivational forces operating within the firm, such as the plant's history of
industrial relations. These conventions are also affected by motivational forces operating outside the firm such as the degree of competition. 6 Once performance patterns become routine, Leibenstein
maintains that effort conventions become quite stable.8 7 Workers as
a group assure adherence to the effort convention by training new
workers and applying social pressures for conformity.8 8 In this way,
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 50.
84 Id. at 96-97.
85 Id. at 77-78. When a game has multiple possible solutions, the one chosen may
depend upon conventional standards of behavior. A convention "is basically an agreedupon regularity of behavior appropriate within a certain set of contexts." Id. at 70. Following a convention is a "nonthinking, passive decision." Id. at 88. This behavior is
"stimulus-response" behavior. Id. at 83. For further discussion of how conventions
solve coordination games, see KREPS, supra note 79, at 65; see also ANDREW SCHOLLTER,
83

THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL INSTITLrrIONS 11 (1981).
86
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 68.

87

Id. at 71.

88 Id. at 81; see also Aoki, supra note 50, at 26 ("Work customs generated and owned
collectively are transferable to new workers through 'social cohesion and group pressures' rather than the market."). Some coordinating conventions do not need much

enforcement. One example is driving on the right-hand side of the road. People follow
this social practice in a non-instrumentally rational way. Yet, in the prisoners' dilemma,

1993]

THE HUMAN CAPITAL ERA

effort conventions that solve the prisoners' dilemma also solve the
free rider problem concerning an individual worker's incentive to
89
shirk when evaluated upon team performance.
Although conventions regarding the level of work effort and the
quality of working conditions are normally sufficient to avoid the
prisoners' dilemma, Leibenstein asserts that these conventions usually fall far below those reached under the golden rule solution. 90
In other words, a considerable amount of X-inefficiency exists
within firms in the United States due to adversarial labor relations.
Supporting this view, a recent study by the MIT Commission on Industrial Relations emphasizes the lack of labor-management cooperation as a significant factor for low productivity in the United
States. 9 '
Suboptimal conventions are unlikely to change unless managers
and workers learn to recognize and avoid the prisoners' dilemma
problem. Leibenstein suggests that this is unlikely to occur in the
absence of outside pressure because the inertia inherent in employment relationships creates disincentives to change established conventions. 9 2 External market forces, however, tend to push the
parties to foster "cultural change" that promotes higher effort
norms. 93 Similarly, industrial relations experts maintain that crisis
periods may be necessary to inspire labor-management cooperation
94
to raise productivity.
incentives exist to cheat. Thus sanctions are necessary to ensure that people abide by
the convention that avoids the prisoners' dilemma solution. Leibenstein suggests that
new workers will follow effort norms set by the workers as a group, even if the group
effort convention conflicts with the orders received from management. LEIBENSTEIN,
INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 74-75.
89 Id. at 57.
90 Id. at 75-76; see also Aoki, supra note 50, at 26 ("[A]s a result of subsequent development of technology in the society at large, conflicts between work customs and efficiency may arise, and once-efficient customs may be turned into 'collective bads' from
the viewpoint of the firm.").
91

MICHAEL DERTOUZOUS ET AL., MIT COMMISSION, MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING

THE PRODUCTIVE EDGE 111, 140 (1989) (arguing that underdeveloped cooperation is a
major obstacle to technological innovation and the improvement of industrial performance); see also COMMISSION ON WORKFORCE QUALITY AND LABOR MARKET EFFICIENCY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, INVESTING IN PEOPLE (1989) (same); DANIEL YANKELOVICH &
JOHN IMMERWAHR, PUTTING THE WORK ETHIC TO WORK: A PUBLIC AGENDA REPORT ON
RESTORING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVE VITAL=TY

25-30 (1983) (workers discuss a "commit-

ment gap" between their performance and the optimal level of performance).
92 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 73; LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC

MAN, supra note 72, at 111-13.

93 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 59, 73.
94 See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 13-15 (periods of significant strategic
adjustment give rise to a wider variety of choices and experiments); Jack Barbash, Do We
Really Want Labor on the Ropes?, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 10 ("Hard times"

may be the essential condition of cooperation).

922

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:899

By emphasizing how productivity depends upon strategic interactions between managers and employees, Leibenstein captures significant aspects of the employment relationship that labor
economists often ignore. Specifically, the theory of effort conventions explains why internal labor markets alone may not necessarily
promote consummate cooperation. Accordingly, Leibenstein's Xefficiency theory provides the basis to assess how participatory work
programs have changed the rules of the productivity game within
firms.
B.

Participatory Work Programs and the Changing Nature of
the Productivity Game

Leibenstein's framework suggests that although Taylorism creates worker alienation and low effort norms, 9 5 firms had few incentives to reduce X-inefficiency when the United States was mostly
isolated and economically unrivaled. Global market pressures, however, have pushed firms to raise effort conventions by providing
higher motivations for workers through participatory work programs. Once effort conventions are destabilized, however, it is not
clear whether strategic bargaining between managers and workers
over the dynamics of readjustment will lead to a superior or inferior
solution for both players, or an outcome under which one player
benefits at the other's expense. On the one hand, new shopfloor
practices create an opportunity to reach the golden rule solution if
workers raise effort norms and employers offer better working conditions. On the other hand, participatory work programs may result
in greater X-inefficiency because the players can move in the opposite direction towards the prisoners' dilemma solution: employees
may withdraw their commitment to the workplace if they perceive
incentive patterns as inadequate and firms can respond to lower effort norms by adopting less desirable work arrangements in order to
maintain control. 96
Thus, although managers and employees are beginning to see
the need for cooperation to increase productivity, the prisoners' dilemma problem still exists because each side must trust the other to
fulfill the terms of the new implicit employment arrangements. This
section analyzes the changing nature of the productivity game and
the factors that may influence how managers and employees will
adapt to the new rules under participatory work programs.
95
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 56 (Taylorism "saw only half the
picture" by missing motivational factors and prisoners' dilemma aspects of production.).
96 Id. at 58.
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1. The Additional Risks of Opportunism

One of the most significant developments in the productivity
game has not received much attention. Compared to Taylorism,
participatory work programs involve a shift in control over production decisions by providing employees on the shopfloor with more
bargaining power in three ways. 97 First, participatory work programs depend upon a highly committed and flexible workforce.
Thus, the employees' ability to establish effort norms has a significant impact upon productivity.98 Second, employees as a group
gain additional leverage because these programs require workers to
develop firm-specific skills. Consequently, it is more difficult for the
firm to replace these workers. 99 Third, "high-discretion" workplaces provide opportunities to develop an informational advantage
concerning production processes. 00 Thus, viewing the game from
the firm's perspective, managers face a great deal of risk in implementing participatory work programs because these sources of
power provide workers with greater ability to threaten to withhold
their cooperation when firms become dependent on the workers'
flexibility and knowledge. 1 1 Although employers have no assurance of consummate cooperation, the internal labor market provides employers with some protection against opportunistic conduct
because employees bond a certain level of performance by accepting
lower wages during their early years of service. 10 2
The higher risks of exploitation under participating work programs run the other way as well. These new shopfloor practices frequently require workers to make additional investments in firmspecific knowledge that increase the difference in opportunity costs
between working for the given firm and the next best alternative. As
these opportunity costs increase, the workers' vulnerability to opportunism also rises. Specifically, after workers acquire these skills,
the firm may renege on the implicit agreement by reducing working
conditions to the level provided to workers without these
abilities. 103
97
98

99

Aoki, supra note 50, at 25.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 102.

100

Id. at 54.

101

See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Politicsof Cooperationin the Workplace, RECONSTRUC-

TION, Winter 1990, at 18, 22 (participatory programs provide workers with more power).
102
103

See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
Jonathan Macey notes:
Unlike high-level managers, who make firm-specific human capital investments as individuals, rank-and-file workers are often trained as groups
and make firm specific human capital investments simultaneously with
their co-workers. This arrangement contains additional potential for ex-
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Compared to the safeguards that internal labor markets provide
employers, workers have significantly less protection from opportunistic conduct by firms. When firms change their production practices, workers lose safeguards previously provided under Taylorism.
Specifically, the routinized production processes of Taylorism restrain the firm's ability to reduce the workforce during a period of
low demand. Additionally, the uniform enforcement of rigid work
rules restricts arbitrary decisionmaking at lower managerial
levels. 10 4 Workers are reluctant to give up these protections because they fear that participatory work programs may lead to job
loss and more intense work standards, commonly referred to as
"speed ups. 10 5 Once firms establish participatory programs, however, employees gain some security because the new shopfloor practices make it difficult to replace team members. Although workers
gain some protection, significant room for opportunistic conduct by
firms remains.
Two factors compound the employees' risk. First, managers
have an informational advantage concerning the employees' impact
on firm profitability. This informational asymmetry causes employees to be suspicious of managements' motives in implementing participatory work programs. This skepticism toward management
initiatives is often reinforced when the strategic policies decided at
the highest level of the firm adopt an adversarial approach to labor
relations while seeking to promote a cooperative atmosphere on the
shopfloor.10 6 For example, many firms using new participatory
techniques simultaneously engage in egregious unfair labor practices. 10 7 Such actions lead workers to fear that managers may attempt to take an excessive share of the firm surplus by announcing
that production is less than it actually is in order to steadily raise
work requirements and decrease working conditions.1 0 8 The secploitation, because firms enjoy economies of scale in hiring and training
workers.
Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific CapitalInvestments, and the Legal Treatment of
FundamentalCorporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 191.
104 The use of the rigid enforcement of job rules is referred to as 'job control
unionism." See, e.g., BRAVERMAN, supra note 42, at 96-100; Michael J. Piore, American
Labor and the IndustrialCrisis, CHALLENGE, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 25.
105
See, e.g., GUILLENMU J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES AND
ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1988) (cooperative programs used to reduce the
influence of unions); MIKE PARKER & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND

THE TEAM CONCEPT 5 (1988) (describing management pressure tactics used to force
workers to accept cooperative work programs and union resistance to such tactics).
106 KOCHAN ET AL., Supra note 1, at 15-17.
107 Id. at 19; KOCHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION, supra note 67, at 272-73.
108 For general discussion of opportunistic conduct by firms using informational advantage, see, e.g., Azariadis & Stiglitz, supra note 26, at 12; Robert E. Hall & David M.
Lilien, Efficient Wages Bargains Under Uncertain Supply and Demand, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 868,
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ond factor that increases employees' risk concerns their relative immobility1 0 9 compared to the international mobility of capital. 110
Even when a firm has remained in a region for a long period of time,
this mobility gives employers a potent bargaining tool.
Also, workers are disadvantaged because employees tend to invest their lives in a corporation and only hold one job. 1 1 Thus,
although participatory work programs create additional opportunities for each player to attempt to gain at the other's expense, the
employees' combined lack of information, risk-aversion, and immobility place them at a distinct disadvantage in playing the productivity game.
2.

The Potentialfor a Prisoners' Dilemma Solution

To increase workers' commitment to new shopfloor practices,
many firms offer to use their best efforts to prevent layoffs and plant
closings.1 12 However, providing effective assurances of employment stability has become more difficult because the corporate restructuring era has brought about a sudden change in labor
relations. Industrial relations experts suggest that opportunistic behavior by some firms in implementing mass layoffs and plant closings has widespread effects. Specifically, this opportunistic behavior
has created a "survival of the fittest" atmosphere that causes the
labor market as a whole to become less secure."13 This instability
871 (1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Equilibrium Long Term Labor Contracts, 98 QO.J. ECON. 23,
48 (Supp. 1983).
109 See, e.g., Diane E. Herz, Worker Displacement in a Periodof RapidJob Expansion: 198387, 113 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 21, 30 (1990) (one out of six displaced workers moved to
another city or country to find employment betweenJanuary 1983 and 1988); Francis W.
Horvath, The Pulse of Economic Change: Displaced Workers of 1981-85, 110 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 3, 10 (1987) (figures slightly lower than subsequent survey).
110 See, e.g., BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETr HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 57 (1980) (stating that the

root of the plant closure crisis is the great speed with which capital is moved around the

world).
111 Clyde Summers states:
If the corporation is conceived in relatively narrow terms as an operating institution combining all factors of production to conduct an ongoing business, then the employees who provide the labor are as much
members of that enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capital.
Indeed, the employees may have made a much greater investment in the
enterprise by their years of service, may have much less ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enterprise than
many of the stockholders.
Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4J. CoMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 155, 170 (1982).
112 For a general discussion of the strategies firms use to provide job security, see,
e.g., JOCELYN F. GUTCHESS, EMPLOYMENT SECURITY IN ACTION: STRATEGIES THAT WORK
(1988) (retraining workers, using temporary labor, and allowing older workers to retire).
113 OsTERMAN, supra note 20, at 77-86.
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has led to a sense of alienation, distrust, and impermanence in the
workplace; even employees who have not directly experienced job
loss recognize the potential for exploitation as they watch their
friends and family members suffer from the harsh consequences of
displacement.' 14 - Translated into the X-inefficiency framework,
Leibenstein's analysis suggests that these external shocks to the labor market may lead to lower effort levels in firms throughout the
United States. In the future, this problem may become more severe
because international competition is likely to cause rapid corporate
restructuring to become a permanent feature of the United States'
economy.1 15
Viewed in this light, intensifying global market pressures increase the risk that employees' concerns about employment stability
will conflict with managers' efforts to contain costs. Given this country's history of adversarial labor relations and the greater potential
for opportunistic conduct under participatory work programs, the
stage is set for an atmosphere of conflict and mistrust. Under the
prisoners' dilemma analysis both players may adopt strategies that
protect their interests in the face of worst case assumptions about
the other, leading to mutual withdrawal and reflexive hostility. To
illustrate, economic pressures may force managers to reduce working conditions. These actions may result in workers withdrawing
their commitment from the workplace in the form of lower effort
conventions. In turn, these countermoves "will be hailed by skeptics as evidence of original sin which justified the low-discretion
work design in the first place," 1 6 leading managers to revert to
traditional shopfloor practices.
While this is a rather negative scenario, it is unfortunately the
path that a very large number of firms may follow because the existing environment may cause the pull toward the prisoners' dilemma solution to be stronger than the pull toward the golden rule
solution. Indeed, industrial relations experts caution that the spiral
of low trust and high conflict may dominate participatory work programs. 1 7 Robert Reich explains that labor and management are
caught in a "vicious circle," because "as the economy continues to
decline, Americans grow more cynical about collective endeavor;
their consequential retreat into egoism merely accelerates the decline since collaboration is the only way to reverse it."118 In other
words, workers and managers are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma
114

Id.

115

KOCHAN

116

(1974).
117

118

r AL., supra note 1, at 228.
ALAN Fox, BEYOND CoNTRAcr: WORK, POWER AND TRUST RELATIONS 116-17
KocHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at
REICH, supra note 1, at 239.

165.
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that makes it difficult for existing facilities in the United States to
compete.
The sum of these individually rational actions, however, falls far
short of the golden rule solution that could be achieved with trusting collaboration. Participatory programs have the potential to lead
to greater X-efficiency because the parties can move in virtuous, as
well as vicious, circles. Specifically, workers should be to willing to
increase firm productivity in return for greater control over the strategic decisions of the corporation and some guarantee ofjob security.119 The next section explores in detail theories of how players
break free of the adversarial cycle that leads to the prisoners' dilemma solution.
C. Solving the Prisoners' Dilemma Presented by Participatory
Work Programs
1. Repeated Play of the Game and the Limits of Economic Theory
The prisoners' dilemma is a noncooperative game, a game in
which the players cannot make credible commitments to cooperate.' 20 Economists suggest, however, that repeated play of a noncooperative game usually produces results similar to those achieved
under a cooperative game in which such commitments are possible. 121 Specifically, repetition allows the implicit agreement to refrain from opportunism to become self-enforcing because each
player recognizes that the decision to defect in any round of play
will trigger a similar response from the other player in the next
round. 122 The combination of the fear of retaliation for defecting
and the prospect of future benefits from cooperating may cause the
players to reach a mutually beneficial solution. Once the players
make the initial move to cooperate, a "lock-in" effect arises that promotes a pattern of collaboration through the game. In the case of
participatory work programs, repeated play of the productivity game
may lead to the golden rule solution. That is, commitments to attain the golden rule solution would be enforced by the threat that,
should the employees defect by reducing their effort levels, the employers would reciprocate in the following round with declining
working conditions.
But there is a problem. An "end-game problem" arises that
threatens cooperation if the parties know in advance when the rela119

See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 50, at 47.

120
121

KREPS, supra note 79, at 29.

This is the so-called "folk theorem" on noncooperative game theory. See, e.g.,
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CooPERATIoN 32 (1984).
122 Id. (describing this as the "tit-for-tat" strategy); KREPS, supra note 79, at 65-71.
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tionship will terminate. 12 3 Under these conditions, cooperation is
no longer beneficial during the last round of play because there will
be no punishment for cheating; thus both players have an incentive
to defect during the last round in order to capture the largest payoff.
The end-game situation poses a serious problem because each
player's strategy for a certain round must be part of optimal strategy
for the entire game. If cooperation is not optimal during the last
round, than there can be no threat of retaliation on the next to the
last round and the parties will have an incentive to defect during the
next to the last stage of the game. Continuing this scenario, game
theory models predict that cooperation will quickly unravel because
it will no longer be optimal on any round of play.
That production may be viewed as a repeated game does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the golden rule solution
will occur. Indeed, during periods of economic decline, both workers and managers have incentives to pursue the "end-game" strategy. As the last round approaches, productivity may fall as workers
attempt to expropriate capital surplus. High relative wages and low
productivity in the American auto and steel industries may be the
result of such end-game scenarios.' 2 4 Managers can also play the
end-game because they no longer have the incentive to maintain
their reputations for trustworthiness. Thus, managers may seek to
renege upon implicit employment agreements by expropriating the
workers' share of the firm surplus in the form of deferred compensation and wages.
Economists suggest that cooperation is more likely under repeated games because rational parties learn that cooperative behavior is efficient. 125 Yet, game theory does not explain why parties
choose to cooperate in the first place, what produces the lock-in effect in repeated games, and what prevents the end-game problem.
The missing ingredient in game theoretic reasoning concerns "one
of the most fragile, yet powerful human dispositions-interpersonal
trust."' 1 26 When parties lack mutual trust, the prisoners' dilemma
123
See KREPS, supra note 79, at 66; Richard Selten, The Chain-StoreParadox, 9 THEORY
& DEcISION 127 (1978).
124 See Colin Lawrence & Robert Z. Lawrence, Manufacturing Wage Dispersion: An End
Game Interpretation, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTivrrY 47, 52 (Brainard & Perry

eds., 1985).
125
126

supra note 121, at 56.
Edward H. Lorenz, Neither FriendsNor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting
AXELROD,

in French Industry, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 201 (Dasputa Gambetta ed., 1988) [hereinafter COOPERATIVE RELATIONS]; see also David M. Kreps

et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON.

THEORY

245 (1982) (End game problem will not arise if players are people who on moral

grounds would never abuse trust or irrationally follow tit-for-tat strategy.). For criticism
of game theory models for avoiding issues concerning trust, see, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON
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solution occurs because mistrust causes the pull toward adversarial
12 7
behavior to be stronger than that toward cooperative behavior.
To overcome the prisoners' dilemma, it is necessary to have action
that is beyond individual rational choice. In other words, a "group
rationality" solution is necessary to reach the golden rule
28
solution.'
Surprisingly, social scientists have not devoted much attention
to the analysis of trust and distrust in social relationships.129 One
possible definition of trust is: "action that (1) increases one's vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one's control, and (2)
takes place in a situation where the penalty suffered if the trust is
abused would lead one to regret the action."' 3 0 Emphasizing the
emotional aspect of trust, William Bratton asserts that trust involves
"a fellow feeling, based on the good will of others."' 13 1 When trust
is abused, these "fellow feelings" produce guilt and the risk of social
disgrace and condemnation.' 3 2 Because of these feelings, parties
can make credible commitments that they will not engage in future
opportunistic conduct. 3 3 Most importantly, parties cannot provide
credible commitments to refrain from self-interest unless the feel134
ings of trust and confidence are heartfelt.
Although economists recognize that trust is an efficient mechanism to reduce negotiating and monitoring costs, 1 35 it is difficult to
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987); Amartya Sen, Goals, Commitment, and Identity, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 341, 342 (1985).
127 See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WrrHIN REASON 252-53 (1988) (Experi-

ments show people cooperate when they expect others to cooperate; they defect when
they expect others to defect.).
128
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 74.
129 BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 5 (1983); NIKLAS LUHMANN,
TRUST AND POWER 8 (1979).
130
Lorenz, supra note 126, at 197; see also Barber, id. at 21 ("[Tlrust is an integrative
mechanism that creates and sustains solidarity in social relationships and systems.");
Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, U. ToRONTo LJ. (forthcoming 1993) ("Trust means that some individual, somewhere in the
economy, must be making a voluntary choice against the alternative which would maximize her preferences or, at least, must be able to get others to believe that she will do
just that.").
131
William W. Bratton,Jr., Self-Interest and Good Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
132
See, e.g., LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 36.
133
See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 127, at 5 ("Being known to experience certain emotions enables us to make commitments that would otherwise not be credible.").
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., KENNETHJ. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (Looking at trust as
a commodity, but noting that "[i]f you have to buy it, you already have some doubts
about what you've bought."); see also Partha Dasgupata, Trust as a Commodity, in COOPERATIVE RELATIONS, supra note 126, at 53 (Trust reduces negotiation and monitoring costs
by protecting expectations in situations that are not covered explicitly in the agreement.); Williamson, supra note 19, at 240-41.
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discuss this behavior using the language of the self-interested, rational actor paradigm. Technically, economists do not use the term
"self-interest" to mean "selfish;" rather the term encompasses many
values including altruism.' 3 6 Yet, James Boyd White doubts that
this is possible, asserting: "one cannot habitually think of human
action in such terms-especially in a culture like our own, which is
so heavily dominated by the motive of self-interest in the usual
sense, that of selfishness or self-centeredness-without tending to
37
universalize their ordinary rather than their technical meanings."'
The language of economics fails to encompass the reality of moral
commitments because it has no way of discussing the concept of
trust except by treating it as a commodity that can be exchanged.
13 8 it
Discussing trust as a commodity is not only dehumanizing,
is also self-defeating because genuine trust is not experienced in
utilitarian terms.1 3 9 In other words, the moral person values trust
for its own sake, not as a matter of material gain. The language of
economics do exemplify certain types of thinking found throughout
our culture. In times of economic decline, the moral person who
fails to pursue self-interest is simply a "chump. ' 140 Ironically, the
chump's moral sentiments confer material advantages in the longrun because refraining from the short-run pursuit of self-interest al136

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3-4

137

JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:

(4th ed. 1992).

AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL

CRITICISM 55 (1990).
138 See, e.g., AMrTAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION-TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 8

(1988) (To economists "a high level of trust reflects not successful socialization but
either numerous prior reiterations, small stakes, or high verification costs."); ROBIN
MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 93

(1990) ("Respect for individual liberty and human dignity require a recognition of the
need for moral dialogue separate and apart from the analysis of costs and benefits in a
purely neoclassical economic sense."); WHITE, supra note 137, at 37 (forms of life
presented by economics contain ethical hazards); WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 8,
at 405 n.20 ("The calculative orientation that economists bring to bear advantageously
on other matters may be a disability on this. Organization theory specialists, being less
committed to the rational spirit, have less baggage to content with."); William Simon,
Social-Republican Proerty, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1388-89 (1992) ("Commodification
undermines the sense of intrinsic satisfaction in economic activities by eroding the sense
of connection between the activity of work and its social meaning and by eroding the
experience of work as membership in a community."); Bratton, supra note 131 (Descriptions of cooperation based on individual self-interest fail because it is not possible to
"eras[e] the ethics of good will from a positive picture that recognizes cooperation as a
maximizing instrument."). These limitations of economics may explain why the growth
of the law and economics movement in law schools may be slowing down. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Bringing Culture andHuman Frailty to RationalActors" A Critique of ClassicalLaw
and Economics, 65 CHi.-KENr L. REV. 23, 23 (1989).
139 ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY 37 (Loyalty is more effective when
employees have a strong attachment to a firm that is similar to other firms.); Bratton,
supra note 131 ("useful ethics are never mere utilitarian instruments").
140

Id. at 249.
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lows credible commitments at a lower cost.' 4 1 That is, the chump's
emotional predisposition allows other parties to confer trust even
when the moral person's actions cannot be monitored. Thus, one
must come to terms with the factors that conventional economic
analysis defines as "extra-economic" by discussing altruistic or
"non-opportunistic" motivations for behavior.
2.

Gift Exchanges and Loyalty Filters

Sociologist George Akerlof incorporates notions of trust and
42
loyalty into the theory of implicit employment arrangements.
Akerlof examines a group of employees who produced more than
the minimum required by the firm without the expectation of rewards. Other economists account for this behavior by suggesting
that employees who enjoy their jobs provide consummate cooperation because they suffer deep regret if they jeopardize their positions by shirking.' 4 3 Yet, in the case studied by Akerlof, the workers
faced only a mild sanction for performance below the minimum. To
explain this seemingly irrational behavior, Akerlof presents an alternative model of implicit employment agreements that describes employees and managers in a trading relationship of partial gift
exchanges. Under this model, norms of gift exchange develop during the employment relationship whereby the firm relaxes work
rules and employees show their appreciation and obligation by providing gifts that consist of diligent work or consummate cooperation. 14 4 Akerlof suggests that workers receive utility from making
gifts to the firm because they acquire sentiment for each other and
45
for the firm.1
Under this gift-exchange model, moral obligations influence
the parties' cost-benefit calculations. Amitai Etzioni explains that
moral values "define, often loosely, what is within the range and
what is beyond the pale."' 14 6 Social conventions inherent in the employment relationship allow general understandings of acceptable
behavior for the gift exchange. Specifically, the reciprocal nature
Id. at 237.
George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as PartialGift Exchange, in EFFICIENCY WAGE
MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET 66 (George Akerlof & Jane Yellen eds., 1986). See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972) (discussing
rival use of gift and exchange as a means of allocating resources).
143 Jurgen Backhaus, Workers' ParticipationStimulated by the Economic Failure of Traditional Organization: An Analysis of Some Recent Institutional Development, in CODETERMINATION, supra note 32, at 227, 241. Akerlof also notes that conventional economic analysis
has difficulty explaining why the workers produced more than required and why the firm
did not raise the minimum standard. Akerlof, supra note 142, at 66.
144 Id. at 73.
145 Id.
146 ETzIONI, supra note 138, at 75.
141

142
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gift exchanges suggest that if one party fails to meet the others' ex1 47
pectations, the other party will respond by withholding its gifts.
For example, if the firm fires a slow worker, the other workers usu148
ally respond by lowering the effort norm as a sanction.
Akerlof's model suggests that the gift exchange nature of employment relationships plays a central role in shaping employees'
moral commitment to coworkers and the firm, as well as providing
them with a sense of fulfillment. In another article, Akerlof introduces the concept of "loyalty filters."' 4 9 He suggests that when
people go through experiences, frequently their loyalties and values
change. 150 Because parties have a choice over their experiences,
they can exercise some choice over their values by actively pursuing
certain loyalty filters. 15 1 By using the notion of loyalty filters to explore preferences, one can examine the organizational and cultural
devices that make trust possible. This analysis, however, challenges
the mainstream economic assumption that preference-shaping
processes are exogenous to market transactions.
In sum, gift exchanges and loyalty filters have important consequences for the changing nature of implicit employment agreements
under participatory work programs. Specifically, they suggest that
extra-economic elements like altruism and loyalty may coincide with
greater X-efficiency. The next section explores how firms using participatory shopfloor practices are attempting to provide loyalty filters by developing corporate cultures that seek to foster high-trust

147
148
149

See Akerlof, supra note 142, at 73.
Id. at 86.
George Akerlof, Loyalty Filters, 73 AM. EcON. REV. 54 (1983).

150

Akerlof explains:
The modeling of each of these aspects of reality constitutes a departure
of importance from standard economic models, capable of explaining
such phenomena as cooperative behavior, class loyalties and much institutional behavior. While the latter allows for the fractional satisfaction of

preferences in their changed form, and so appears quite conventional in
its continued instrumental approach to individual choice, it is, nevertheless, still a quite unconventional and non-instrumental approach to institutions, or games, in that now these are seen not only as devices through
which individuals seek to satisfy given preferences, but also as mechanisms through which their given preferences are changed.
Id. at 62.
151
Id. at 56 (teaching children a code to act against their own short-run interest
even while it serves their long-run economic interests); see also FRANK, supra note 127, at
69 (The commitment model requires "a central role for cultural conditioning in the
acquisition of moral sentiments. People may even make rational choices about the sorts
of conditioning they expose themselves to."); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Legal Persons and Moral
Worlds: Ethical Choices Within the Corporate Environment, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 75, 75 (1991)
("Preferences are never entirely exogenous; the corporate environment affects in significant ways the character of ethical decision-making by individuals within its hierarchy.").
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work relations which encourage worker identification with the com52
pany and its goals.'
3.

The Role of Loyalty Filters in Reshaping Corporate Culture

This section focuses upon the role of the firm as a social institution to examine how corporate cultures involve unwritten rules of
the productivity game that establish norms of behavior for firm
members.' 5 3 By focusing upon these norms, it is possible to see
how the policies that underlie shopfloor practices significantly influence the way people perceive both labor relations and corporations.
For example, one cannot overstate the effect that the historical sepa54
ration of "thinkers" from "doers" has had upon our culture.'
Taylorism reduces the need for firms to rely upon the gift exchange
aspect of the employment relationship by using specialized job assignments and heavy monitoring. Consequently, moral commitments to coworkers and firm loyalty are less important for
production.
The shift from Taylorism to participatory work programs represents a transition from "low trust" to "high trust" work relations.' 55
Under participatory work programs, employers have significant responsibilities; these programs are implemented with the expectation
that this high level of trust will be reciprocated by employees on the
shopfloor by providing greater effort and creativity. This reliance
upon the gift exchange aspect of work relations implies a more general change of customs, attitudes, and values that are part of our
cultural heritage. In order to facilitate this gift exchange, firms seek
152
In a sense, the corporate culture defines well understood rules for the productivity game which economize on bounded rationality. Thus, corporate culture has something of the nature of firm-specific capital. Similarly, firm loyalty, like other firm-specific
human capital investments, increase the workers' value to the firm, but are of no particular benefit to other firms. See, e.g., Jacques Cremer, Common Knowledge and the Co-ordination of Economic Activities, in TREATIES, supra note 38, at 53, 59; see also David Kreps,
Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PosrrIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
(James Alt & Kenneth Shepsle eds., 1990).
153 In contrast to this view of the firm as a social institution, neoclassical economic
theory perceives the firm as a series of market-like contracts. Alchian and Demsetz exemplify this view:
To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is
a deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in
renegotiation of contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties. Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than
that brand of bread.
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 777. In my view, the firm represents a social institution involving informal codes of behavior that serve as substitutes for this type of market-like contracting.
154
See REICH, supra note 1, at 173.
155
Fox, supra note 116, at 116-17 (using "high trust jobs" and "low trust jobs" to
distinguish work roles).
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to change traditional work attitudes by developing environments
that are more conducive to higher performance and morale. As a
result, participatory work practices have given rise to attempts to
promote a shared "culture" or corporate value system. 15 6 In developing these corporate value systems, firms establish informal moral
codes for cooperative behavior that promote group success by encouraging employees to act in the firm's best interests rather than
their own.
Because employees and managers have incompatible goals, it
would be irrational for either party to exhibit totally trusting attitudes. Yet, the employment relationship is conducive to mutual
trust because it is characterized by mutual dependence.1 5 7 A party
that is receptive towards a trusting relationship can send signals to
the other party that it is safe to develop trust. 158 Once trust is given,
it can be maintained by continuously sending signals to foster "systems trust." Under systems trust, people overcome informational
barriers by relying instead upon the structural properties of their
15 9
relationship with the other party.
Firms implementing participatory work programs attempt to
foster systems trust in two ways. First, many of these firms are moving away from hierarchical enforcement of corporate goals. Hierarchy signals that managers are more important to the firm than
workers and that workers cannot be trusted.1 60 Consequently, hierarchy creates distance and separation between members at different
levels of the organization. 1 6 1 In contrast, participatory shopfloor
practices attempt to nurture the employment relationship by reducing supervision and increasing job satisfaction and employee commitment. Firms use non-authoritarian management styles to create
156

For a general discussion of different types of corporate cultures see, e.g., TER-

RENCE E. DEAL & ALLAN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RrrES AND RrrUALS OF

CORPORATE LIFE (1987) (how to create more cooperation culture); WILLIAM G. OUCHI,
THEORY Z (1987) (corporate culture in Japanese firms); PAUL THOMPSON & DAVID McHUGH, WORK ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1990) (critical analysis of the
merchandising of corporate cultures); WILLIAM H. WHYrE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN

(1956) (criticizing how the corporate culture shapes the values of middle managers).
For the impact that changing corporate cultures has on the new shopfloor practices, see,
e.g., Irene Goll, Environment, Corporate Ideology, and Employee Involvement Programs, 30 INDUS. REL. LJ. 138 (1991) (survey of 159 manufacturing companies concludes that corporate ideology has a significant effect on participative practices in both union and
nonunion settings).
157 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 37.

158

Id. at 28, 37; FRANK, supra note 127, at 98, 105.

159 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 37 (explaining use of systems trust). See generally
HIRSHMAN, supra note 139, at 79 ("[T]he most loyalist behavior retains an enormous

dose of reasoned calculation.").
160 HECKSCHER, supra note 40, at 88.
161 LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 101 (Workers cannot "judge how
relatively unknown and faceless members of the bureaucracy will react.").
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a climate of trust and to encourage employer identification with the
company's goals. Second, firms using the new shopfloor practices
hold periodic group meetings to promote social and emotional ties
among coworkers. 162 These meetings also reinforce the cultural
conditioning necessary for employees to internalize the norms and
values of the organization.
Efforts to create a more cooperative climate on the shopfloor by
reducing monitoring and building team spirit usually have some
positive influence upon the workplace atmosphere. 163 It is unlikely,
however, that these attempts to reshape the corporate culture will
encourage a great amount of trust. 164 These signals for developing
systems trust do not have much credibility because they are inexpensive and easy to fake. 16 5 Under the new corporate cultures, the
most important factors that lead to the low-trust syndrome between
managers and workers remain ineffectual. For example, firms send
conflicting signals when workers are laid off during the course of a
participatory program. 166 Consequently, recent steps taken to promote cooperation do not remove the threat of industrial conflict.
Indeed, studies indicate that employee trust and confidence in man67
agement practices has declined in the last decade.'
Although recent attempts to change the corporate culture involve low-risks steps, these efforts are significant because they raise
issues concerning the social organization of the corporation and
preference-shaping processes, which have not received much attention in the past. Specifically, the focus upon corporate culture raises
questions about the gift exchange nature of the employment relationship and how this gift exchange can be supported by providing
162
See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 127, at 239 ("[F]eelings of moral responsibility are
much more focused on people with whom we have close personal ties. This suggests
that shirking might be attacked by creating a work environment that fosters closer personal ties between coworkers.").
163
See, e.g., KocHAN r AL., supra note 1, at 87 (short-term effects on changes);
THOMPSON & McHUGH, supra note 156, at 234 ("At least some of the hoop-la and contrived events could produce a stream of Hawthorne effects of a short-lived and superficial nature."); C.A. Roy, Corporate Culture: The Last Frontierof Control, 23 J. MGMT. STUD.
287, 292-93 (1986) ("[W]hile bureaucratic control may prompt individuals to act as if
the company is a source of meaning and commitment, that is an entirely different matter
from seriously believing it.").
164
See, e.g., THOMPSON & McHUGH, supra note 156, at 99; Jeremy Brecher, Uncovering
the Hidden History of the American Workplace, 10 REv. RADICAL POL. ECON. 1, 20 (1978) (New
corporate cultures involve "window dressing which leaves untouched the essential tyranny of the capitalist labor process.").
165
THOMPSON & McHUGH, supra note 156, at 99.
166 See, e.g., KocHAN ET AL., WORKER PARTICIPATION, supra note 67, at 58-59; Mare,
Debate, supra note 5, at 66-67.
167
See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 214 (About one-half of the workforce
remains skeptical of top management's ability or willingness to address the full range of
worker interests or expectations.).
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loyalty filters. To attain the golden rule solution it is necessary to
take further steps to reshape the corporate culture, steps which accept the differences in organizational goals between employers and
workers. 16 8 Specifically, firms could foster this culture by coordinating labor policies at the shopfloor, collective bargaining, and strategic decisionmaking levels within the corporate structure.1 69 The
next part explores these issues by analyzing how legal reform mandating codetermination may allow the parties to avoid the prisoners'
dilemma problem by altering the rules of the game so that cooperation is easily recognized as a more attractive strategy than defection.
III
X-EFFICIENCY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

This part analyzes how legal reform that grants employees a
role in corporate governance would support the gift exchange of
high effort expenditure by workers and working conditions by managers. Part IV of this Article proposes a new model of corporate
governance with directors serving as neutral referees to mediate the
competing concerns of stockholders and employees. The neutral
referee model has many of the goals sought by the German system
of codetermination. This part uses the familiar codetermination
model to examine how labor representation in corporate governance enables corporate cultures to facilitate participatory work programs. After examining how codetermination enhances Xefficiency, this part provides an efficiency justification for legal intervention to require firms to provide labor representation on corporate boards.
A.

X-Efficiency and Worker Representation on Corporate
Boards

Under the German system of codetermination, workers elect
representatives to serve on supervisory boards of directors that engage in strategic corporate decisionmaking. t7 0 Codetermination,
however, does not directly enable labor to force major changes in
168
Id. at 244; REICH, supra note 1, at 268 (Adjustment to economic change requires
that burdens and benefits be fairly shared.).
169
See, e.g., Klare, Debate, supra note 5, at 77 ("Progress toward democratizing work
requires abandoning the notion of a choice between adversarial and cooperative models
and developing instead institutional structures that combine the virtues and mitigate the
disadvantages of each.").
170
For discussion of the German system and developments in the European Community, see, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of CorporateManagement: A Comparison of
Developments in European Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459 (1984);
Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participationin the U.S. and West Germany: A ComparativeStudy
From an American Perspective, 28 AM.J. COMP. L. 367 (1980); Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the
"Modern" Corporation: Perspectives From the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966).
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corporate policy. Rather, most of the employees' influence occurs
17 1
through separate employee organizations called Works Councils.
Codetermination enhances the effectiveness of these Works Councils by providing labor representatives with the opportunity to attend board meetings and review firm documents. Employees can
gain access to reliable information concerning the firms' financial
situation and planned innovations concerning work rules and technological shifts. Although providing workers with representation
on corporate boards increases organizational costs, these additional
expenses are outweighed by the potential gain of eliminating X-inefficiencies under the traditional system of corporate governance.
Under the traditional system, employee distrust arises because
managers have an informational advantage and nonlegal enforcement mechanisms are inadequate to prevent the expropriation of
human capital investments.' 7 2 For these reasons, employees resist
technological advances and new shopfloor practices by insisting
upon contractual work rules that limit and delay such innovations. 173 Conversely, codetermination facilitates the flow of credible
information to employees. Employees are less skeptical about management's assessment of the firm's economic condition because they
have access to the information needed to make their own evaluation. 174 By enhancing workers' ability to monitor the firms' performance, codetermination restrains opportunistic conduct by firms.
Specifically, if managers renege upon implicit employment arrangements, employees can hold them accountable in future interactions
by withdrawing cooperation and reducing effort norms. 17 5 In this
way, codetermination provides incentives for employees to invest in
firm-specific skills by protecting these investments from
expropriation. 1 7 6
171

See, e.g., Roy Adams, Workers'Participationin Management in West Germany: Impact on

the Worker, the Enterpriseand the Trade Union, 8 INDUS. REL. LJ. 4 (1977); Clyde W. Sum-

mers, An American Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation,CoMP. LAB. L.J.
333 (1987).
172
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
173
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
174
See, e.g., Jurgen Backhaus, Workers' ParticipationStimulated by the Economic Failureof
Traditional Organization: An Analysis of Some Recent Institutional Developments, in
CODM-ERMINATrION, supra note 32, at 227, 232; Eirik G. Furubotn & Steven N. Wiggins,
Plant Closings, Worker Reallocation Costs and Efficiency Gains to Labor Representationon Board of
Directors, 140 J. INST. AND THEORETICAL ECON. 176 (1984).
175
See Roger McCain, A Theory of Codetermination, 40J. EcoN. 65, 83 (1980) (arguing
that strategic information offers the employees a "more valuable hostage" in future negotiations with managers).
176
See, e.g., Eger & Weise, supra note 32, at 64. Codetermination also enhances the
internal efficiency of firm operations because workers are in many respects better positioned to monitor a firm's management than shareholders. Henry Hansmann, When Does
Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99
YALE LJ. 1749, 1768 (1990). Other commentators cast doubt upon the idea that work-
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By reducing the employees' risk of opportunism, codetermination provides a commitment structure that supports the process of
building high trust relations between managers and workers.177 Cooperative behavior depends upon the willingness of one player to
make the initial move to cooperate, which risks exploitation by the
other player. 178 Under codetermination, firms make this type of cooperative move by relinquishing an informational advantage. At the
same time, however, this move increases the firm's vulnerability to
opportunism by employees. Yet, this loss of control is exactly the
type of necessary risk-exposing action that plays an important role
in promoting the lock-in effect which establishes patterns of collaborative conduct. 179 Viewed in this light, codetermination involves a
high-risk step that sends a strong signal of managerial trustworthiness and dedication to a more cooperative regime in volatile economic conditions.
By sending this signal to support the process of building trust,
codetermination establishes the basis for a corporate culture that
elicits high commitment performance. Under this culture, workers
may feel a moral obligation to reciprocate managers' trust by establishing higher effort levels, setting in motion a cycle of cooperative
efforts on the shopfloor.' 8 0 For example, employees may have
greater enthusiasm for new production methods because they have
some information to ensure that they will realize the benefits from
these innovations.' 8 ' In addition, communication throughout the
ers have the proper incentives to enhance the internal efficiency of the firm. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. ECON. 395,
403-06 (1983) (Workers lack incentives to exercise correct discretion in choosing among
investment projects.); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production
Functions: An Application to Labor-ManagedFirmsand Codetermination, 52J. Bus. 469,482-84
(1979) (Because horizon is limited to working life, investment decisions favor of quick
payoff.).
177 Marvin E. Rozen, X-Efficiency, Implicit Contracting,and the Theory of the Firm, in STUDIES IN ECONOMIC RATIONALITY:

X-EFFICIENCY EXAMINED AND EXTOLLED 95, 115 n.15

(1990) (Klaus Weiermair & Mark Perlman eds., 1990) ("Substantive parity between the
parties, or at least the absence of great disparities, in the relevant dimensions of economic strength is likely to be a prerequisite for trust to bloom. Dependency, because it
implies one-way flows, corrodes trust."). Alan Hyde and Robert Reich propose the use
of employee stock option plans (ESOPs) to remedy problems of low employee trust.
ROBERT REICH, TALES OF NEW AMERICA (1987); Hyde, supra note 80.
178 AXELROD, supra note 121, at 113-15.
179 LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 55 (This enhanced communication allows "the person who gives his trust [to be] in possession of enough reality to be able occasionally to
opt out of using them.").
180 See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 116 (providing strategic information to
employees will contribute to gains on the shopfloor); Furubotn & Wiggins, supra note
174, at 64. See generally Lorenz, supra note 126, at 53 (stating that when trust is created,
obligated not to betray trust).
181 See, e.g., Eirik Furubotn, Codetermination, Productivity Gains and the Economics of the
Firm, 37 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 22, 27 (1985) (codetermination improves information
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firm may be enhanced as employees respond by relinquishing their
informational advantage concerning knowledge about more efficient
processes and work rules on the shopfloor. Furthermore, workers
may be more willing to accept lower working conditions in times of
financial difficulty because they will have more confidence that they
will gain from these sacrifices in the long-run. Accordingly, through
repeated play of the game, managers can obtain some assurance
that employees aspire to provide consummate cooperation for par-

ticipatory work programs.18 2
Supporting this view, economist Masahiko Aoki emphasizes that
firms acquire market flexibility by providing labor with representation on corporate boards. For example, German and Japanese corporations appear to be more X-efficient than firms in the United
States. Aoki asserts that these productivity differences are partly explained by more employee participation in corporate governance.18 3
Of course, codetermination does not automatically produce
greater X-efficiency by offering an easy solution to the prisoners'
dilemma problem created in participatory work programs. It does,
however, facilitate the resolution of this dilemma by increasing the
flow of information within the firms and thereby providing greater
opportunities for effective communication between labor and management. 8s4 Although repeated play of the productivity game may
also lead to labor-management cooperation under the traditional
system of corporate governance, codetermination is more favorable
to such an outcome because it removes informational barriers that
increase the potential for the prisoners' dilemma solution.
Given these possible increases in X-efficiency, it is necessary to
address the need for legal intervention to require labor representa-

flows between managers and workers); McCain, supra note 175, at 83-84 (Transition
from collective bargaining to codetermination reduces the number of employees's "free
variables" concerning work effort.); see also Roger McCain, Increasing 'Alienation:' The
Working Environment and the Directionof Technical Progress Under Alternative Forms of Enterprise
Organization,3 ADVANCES IN THE ECON. ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATORY AND LABOR MANAGED
FIRMS 83, 101 (1988) (same) [hereinafter McCain, Alienation]; KoCHAN ET AL., supra note
1, at 111 (Prior consultation and participation increases employees commitment to
changes in production methods and willingness to reveal production inefficiencies.).
182

MASAHIKO AOKI, INFORMATION, INCENTIVES, AND BARGAINING IN THE JAPANESE

EcoNoMY 154 (1988); Roger McCain, Codetermination, Collective Bargaining, Commitment,
and Sequential Games, in CODETERMINATION, supra note 32, at.115.
183
Aoki, supra note 38, at 124 ("T]he impression gained by observing the divergent
performances of firms having different national-institutional structures is that the relative magnitude of institutional inefficiency may be substantial."); Aoki, supra note 50, at
24 (Despite cultural and historical differences, there is a world-wide tendency to recognize employees's voice in corporate governance.).
184 Eger & Weise, supra note 32, at 28; McCain, Alienation, supra note 181, at 104;
Warren J. Samuels, Institutional Reform: The Future of Codetermination: Comment, in
CODETERMINATION, supra note 32, at 223, 225.
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tion on corporate boards. In addressing this issue, the next section
explores several ways in which the existing sociopolitical system impedes the incentives for firms to adopt codetermination on a voluntary basis.
B.

The Need for a Legal Solution to Solve the Prisoners'
Dilemma
1. Legal Intervention to Redistribute Power
a. Firms Have a "First Mover Advantage" Under the Existing
Rules of the Game

Corporate law should mandate codetermination because, in the
absence of crisis in situations, managers and shareholders tend to
resist employee participation in strategic decisionmaking. Under
the existing framework for collective bargaining, management has
no legal duty to negotiate with unions about economic restructuring, technological innovation, and job security.185 Unions have difficulty in bargaining for explicit contractual protections on these
issues because management often insists on "managerial prerogative" clauses in order to maintain control over the firm's
86
operations. 1
Because codetermination involves sharing control with employees, this redistribution of power ensures that managers and shareholders will oppose proposals for worker representation on the
185 See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681-86 (1981) (Section
8(d) does not apply to the decision to terminate business.); Otis Elevator Co., 269
N.L.R.B. 891, 893 94 (1984) (no duty to bargain over relocation); see also JIM ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERMCAN LABOR LAW (1983) (One of the dominant social
values in the interpretation and evolution of labor law is that workers do not have the
ability to make strategic decisions.).
186 See, e.g., Staughton Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 396,410 (1979) ("[L]abor relinquishes its most effective weapon against
management-its ability to strike . . . [while] management retains the prerogative to
disrupt the lives of its employees by relocating or closing its facilities."). Existing interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) draw a line between the extent of
bargaining and the scope of unilateral decisionmaking referred to as the management
prerogative. Employers must bargain over whether to relocate a plant only if the managers' determination is prompted by the need to reduce labor costs. Decisions based on
general economic conditions are not subject to mandatory bargaining. Although the
NLRA does not provide much relief, presumably, unions would attempt to negotiate for
explicit contractual protections against layoffs and plant closings. If managers were willing to negotiate over these issues, employees could attempt to bargain for tin parachutes
that provide sufficient amounts of severance pay to compensate employees for their

firm-specific investments. However, several contracting obstacles would arise. The parties would have difficulty in specifying the events that would trigger the tin parachute.
Additionally, enforcement problems exist because the labor law successorship rules do
not bind a purchaser of assets to a previous collective bargaining agreement. Professor
Stone explains in more detail the problems in drafting enforceable, effective tin
parachutes. Stone, supra note 82, at 63-64.
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corporate boards. Managers recognize that giving up managerial
prerogatives improves the bargaining position of labor, thereby increasing the risk of opportunism. In game theory terms, the existing labor laws allow managers to have a "first mover" advantage
in the productivity game.'8 7 The prisoners' dilemma suggests that
first mover advantages increase the potential, for X-inefficiency because managers probably will act "rationally" and refuse to share
decisionmaking with employees, even though cooperation offers
88
larger returns.'
b. A Response to Free Market Arguments Against Legal
Intervention to Redistribute Power
Free market advocates argue that legal intervention is not
needed to redistribute control within the firm because in the long
run, competition ensures that internally efficient results dominate.' 8 9 Under competitive conditions, only the most cost-effective
governance structures will survive. Accordingly, free market proponents suggest that labor representation on the board is less efficient,
because otherwise it would replace the traditional system in the free
market.' 90 Williamson emphasizes that parties have incentives to
adopt governance mechanisms that mitigate the threat of opportunism.' 9 ' Thus, firms using participatory shopfloor practices have
the incentive to implement codetermination in order to reduce the
wages necessary to compensate workers for the risks of
opportunism.
Free market advocates assert that government has little power
over impersonal market pressures that cause corporate restructuring. They warn that regulation of economic forces will ultimately
harm employees by decreasing investment incentives. Furthermore,
free market advocates argue that attempts to change the law will end
up hurting employees because employers will force them to pay for
these rights through lower wages. 192 These definitive accounts of
187

Ekkehart Schlicht, Codetermination, Collective Bargaining, Commitment, and Sequential

Games: Comment, in
188 Id.
189

CODETERMINATION,

supra note 32, at 129.

WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 39 n.22.

190 Id. at 33; Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 14, at 787;Jensen & Meckling, supra note
11, at 473.
191
WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 373; Daniel Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law
Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1984)
(Firms would voluntarily deal with unions in order to reduce their cost of labor just as
they voluntarily have their financial statements audited in order to reduce their cost of
capital.).
192
The law allows firms to externalize the cost of providing for displaced workers by
imposing this cost on the public sector. Corporate restructuring may result in long-term
benefits for the economy. These new opportunities, however, fail to assure that workers
faced with job displacement are compensated for their investments in the corporation.
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the inevitability of plant closure and the futility of regulation lead to
the conclusion that no alternative exists to the free market.
In this way, free market analysis serves to acclimatize labor to
the existing legal framework. Williamson provides a striking example of the free marketers' propensity to reaffirm the status quo when
he argues that workers prefer participatory methods of shopfloor
organization and corporate governance systems over the traditional
methods. Because Williamson maintains that participatory programs are less efficient, he suggests that workers in these firms will
receive lower wages.1 95 Next, Williamson states that workers "reveal their preferences" when they chose Tayloristic practices and
high wages over employment offering higher job satisfaction but
lower wages. 19 4 Similarly, Williamson asserts that workers "reveal
their preferences" for traditional corporate governance systems
when they chose conventional employment over opportunities to
work for firms with alternative structures that offer participation in
governance, such as worker cooperatives.' 95
Studies show that workers prefer higher wages over better
working conditions. 196 Yet participatory work programs may substantially increase the X-efficiency of the firm, allowing workers to
obtain both higher wages and better working conditions. To
achieve this result, however, labor participation in corporate governance structures needs to support these programs in order to foster an atmosphere conducive to a high level of employee trust.
Traditionally, employees have not participated in strategic corporate decisionmaking.19 7 This historical pattern, however, is
changing. The major impetus for change is growing employer
Free market proponents argue that workers who are not hired at new plants lose as
much as workers gain at the plant that is not closed. Macey, supra note 103, at 179. This
article disagrees. People feel the loss of a "psychologically vested right of a given market value more keenly than the loss of a prospect (a psychologically unvested right) of
identical market value." Ellickson, supra note 138, at 37 (discussing Tversky Kahneman
analysis). This argument draws upon the personhood theory of property rights and
posits that a worker develops an attachment to his job which is critical to his personal
identity. As Holmes stated: "[T]he true explanation of title by prescription seems to me
to be that man, like a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots have grown to a certain size, cannot be displaced without
cutting at his life." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897); see also POSNER, supra note 136, at 79 ("Over time a person becomes attached to
property that he regards as his own, and the deprivation of the property would be
wrenching.").
193
Williamson, supra note 28, at 34-35.
194
Id.
195 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 472 (suggesting demands for democratization of the workplace arise more from political activists than from the workforce).
196 PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 177 n.93 (1990) (discussing studies
concluding that workers rank pay higher than job satisfaction).
197 KoCHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 181. Karl Klare explains:
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awareness that important decisions lie beyond the scope of collective bargaining.1 98 Increasingly, employees consider exchanging
wage increases for greater employment security and more influence
in decisionmaking.1 99 These developments have been concentrated
in crisis situations that threaten layoffs and plant closings. 200 These
changes still represent fundamental departures from the traditional
system of labor relations. Industrial relations experts suggest that
employee interest in corporate governance will grow as global market pressures continue to require strategic decisionmaking that adversely impacts the employees' welfare. 20 1
Free market proponents' references to the immutable laws of
economics attempt to depoliticize social issues concerning displaced
workers and industrial democracy. Such legitimating theories obscure the choices involved in enhancing employee participation in
corporate decisionmaking, which affects job security and working
conditions. In contrast, this Article contends that these choices
have significant implications for the efficiency of corporate behavior
in responding to international competition. In examining the need
for legal intervention, the next section explores how the sociopolitical system in the United States discourages firms from relinquishing
their first mover advantages concerning managerial prerogatives.
2.

Participatory Work Programs and Socioeconomic Development
a.

Free Rider Problems Impede Incentives to Change Conventions
Governing Industrial Relations

Cultural norms, conventions, and institutions increase the
transaction costs involved in introducing codetermination through
the contracting process. Given the long-standing convention of
shareholder supremacy and resistance to employee involvement in
strategic decisionmaking, firms are reluctant to deviate from the
traditional system of corporate governance because they fear
reputational sanctions for violating established business practices.
[1]f the legal system has historically been heavily biased in favor of hierarchy and against participation, the alleged employee preference of hierarchy may be "adaptive." If so, the efficiency attack on legal reform aimed
to increase participation is circular reasoning. Legal reforms of the sort
proposed here might enhance efficiency by removing the endogenous
conditioning of employee preferences.
Klare, Agenda, supra note 5, at 35.
198
INDUS.
199
200

See, e.g., Thomas A. Kochan et al., Strategic Choice and IndustrialRelations Theoy, 23
REL.J. 16 (1984).
See, e.g., DOERINGER, supra note 1, at 133; KocHAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 112.
See, e.g., Kocsmt Er n., supra note 1, at 112 (Airline carriers near bankruptcy, not

able to offer employment guarantees, are much more likely to grant unions a broadened
role in management affairs.).
201 Id at 220.

944

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:899

Given these reputational sanctions, free rider problems prevent
firms from undertaking the steps necessary to transform the existing
customs to favor more progressive labor policies.
In changing conventions, game theoretic reasoning suggests
that an individual firm will not necessarily move to the superior option of using codetermination, since it is not a superior option unless other firms also move and thereby alter widely accepted notions
of proper labor-management relations. 2 02 But other firms will not
move unless each firm can be persuaded that all the other firms will
also move simultaneously. In addition to these free rider problems,
each firm has an additional incentive to "hang back" because the
current restructuring era creates strong competitive pressures for
each firm to forgo the organizational costs in establishing
codetermination in order to maintain short-term stock prices. Thus,
firms are unwilling to adopt codetermination because it involves the
creation of industrial relations that transcend the narrow contracting process. Consequently, public policy sets the climate for
labor-management relations by legitimating specific models of corporate governance and affecting the costs associated with alternative
3
practices. 20
b.

CulturalSupportfor Participatory Work Programs

The existing legal system not only promotes cultural conditioning that inhibits incentives to provide codetermination, it also perpetuates the tendency for opportunistic behavior that leads to
adversarial labor relations. Under existing social and market norms,
firms that breach implicit employment arrangements face reputational sanctions in the labor market. These extralegal sanctions,
however, lose their effectiveness because the law condones the Darwinian process of "Creative Destruction." By failing to mitigate
these destructive impulses, the law represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community in the firm, and sanctions the
expropriation of workers' firm-specific investments. In times of economic decline, the law promotes widespread instability in the labor
market that impedes efforts to nurture the gift-exchange necessary
for the success of participatory work programs.
Williamson acknowledges that the sociopolitical system negatively influences the cooperative attitudes required for participatory
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 74.
203 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kochan & Michael J. Piore, Will the New IndustrialRelations
Last? Implicationsfor the American Labor Movement, ANNALS, May 1984, at 473 ("These
changes at the micro level of industrial relations are likely to be successful only if
macroeconomic policies are reformed to provide a more supportive role for the labor
movement in society.").
202
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work programs. 20 4 Specifically, he doubts that participatory work
programs will be successful in the United States because these programs depend upon a system of relational contracting to prevent
opportunistic conduct.2 0 5 Williamson explains:
The 'special problems' of soft contracting .

.

. are particularly

great when soft contracting is introduced into an alien culture.
The reason for this is that the entire burden of providing contractual safeguards falls entirely on the immediate parties to the transaction if background cultural supports are missing. Should one of
the parties choose to defect, there is no further support for sus20 6
taining the transaction to which either can appeal.
Because participatory work programs depend on the background
culture to provide reputational sanctions, 20 7 Williamson suggests
that participatory programs may be more viable in countries like Japan rather than the U.S. For these reasons, Williamson asserts that
the United States may have to employ the traditional model of work
208
organization.
Williamson raises important issues by emphasizing how societal
and corporate cultures interact. However, he fails to recognize that
the law significantly affects industrial relations by influencing conventions of economic behavior that develop within firms. 20 9 Legal
reform is necessary to provide employees with a role in corporate
governance to create the atmosphere of trust needed to overcome
the prisoners' dilemma problems inherent in participatory work
programs. Supporting this view, industrial relations experts suggest
that because German and Japanese corporations traditionally depended upon foreign trade, the frequent need to adjust to external
204 WILLIAMSON, CAPITAmSM, supra note 8, at 39 n.22.
205 Oliver Williamson & W. G. Ouchi, The Markets and Hierarchies Programme of Research: Origins, Implications, Prospects, in POWER, EFFICIENCY AND INSTTUTmNS 26-28 (Arthur Francis et al. eds., 1983).
206 Id. at 28; see also LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra note 72, at 54 ("Western
culture does not emphasize altruistically cooperative behavior for its own sake ....
It
appears more natural to try to be a big winner by performing according to a win/lose
strategy rather than by adhering to an extremely cooperative convention.").
207 Id. at 27.
208 WILLtAMSON, CAPrrALISM, supra note 8, at 28. Similarly, John Macey asserts:
[A] Japanese-style employment regime in which workers have job tenure
and employers have de facto assurances from workers that they will not
leave for other jobs in fact may be more efficient. But in this country
workers and their employees are not able to make employment contracts
containing these provisions because they would not be enforceable in
U.S. courts. Consequently, the dominant American regime of employment at will may be the market's second-best solution in the face of this
legal impediment to the contracting process.
Jonathan Macey, Firm-Specific Human CapitalInvestments and Hegelian Ethics: A Comment on
Cornell and Posner, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 507 (1990).
209 See, e.g., KocRAN ET AL., Supra note 1, at 230; LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM, supra
note 72, at 53 (law supports conventions inside firm).
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and internal labor dislocations prompted early cooperation between
government, labor, and business to cope with the problems of displaced workers.2 10 Recognizing these historical influences, Robert
Reich suggests that: "[a]daptation [to the new realities of international competition] will require that American institutions, both
public and private, support the social changes that must accompany
economic change. And for this to occur, America must transcend
the peculiar distinction traditionally drawn between our civic culture
'2 1 1
and our business culture.
IV
THE NEUTRAL REFEREE MODEL OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE

In this part, I will propose a new model of corporate governance that would broaden directorial fiduciary duties to encompass
employees as members of the firm. First, I will explore how recent
developments in the areas of corporate law and labor law show
some signs of change in this direction. Next, I will discuss how corporate fiduciary law could be revised to protect employees from opportunistic conduct and promote corporate cultures that foster
mutual trust between managers and employees.
A.

Redefining Corporate Law and Labor Law: Reflecting the
Employees' Changing Role in the Corporate Structure

In the past, the dominant role of collective bargaining in labor
law and the prevailing paradigm of shareholder supremacy in corporate law have created intellectual barriers to consideration of viable
corporate schemes to promote labor-management cooperation.
These underlying assumptions, however, are being challenged as
both labor law and corporate law undergo a process of transformation that reflects the changing nature of the employees' role in the
corporate structure. At the shopfloor level, there is a growing interest in amending the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 2 12 in removing barriers that prevent firms from establishing employee
committees, and in discussing issues that traditionally have been reserved for union representation. At the board level, directorial fiduciary duties have been revised to allow greater discretion to consider
employee interests in making strategic decisions. Although these
210
211

REICH,

supra note 1, at 10.

Id. at 6; see also Joseph Singer, Stakeholders, U. TORoNTo L.J. (forthcoming 1993)

(We "face a quasi-constitutional problem about the forms of social life we want to
adopt.").
212
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
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changes are significant, these developments are inadequate to meet
the needs of the modem workplace.
1. Participatory Work Programs: Challenging the Framework of the
NLRA
Given that less than seventeen percent of the workforce is unionized, 2 13 the existing system of labor law that emphasizes collective bargaining simply does not describe the realities of
contemporary American labor relations. 2 14 For this reason, many
labor scholars maintain that a need exists for employees to have the
opportunity to participate in alternative mechanisms of workplace
governance that would complement the present system of union
representation. A foundation to establish such institutions can be
seen in efforts by many corporations to implement employee involvement committees that oversee the policy decisions involved in
participatory work programs. 2 15 At this point, however, these ef2 16
forts appear to conflict with the NLRA in two respects.
First, some types of participatory work programs may violate
the prohibition against company involvement in labor organizations. 2 17 Under the NLRA, the framework for collective bargaining
213
See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers's Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1769, 1778-81 (1983) (describing decline of unionism
and growing anti-unionism in business community).
214
Clyde Summers, Labor Law As the Century Turns: A Changingof the Guard, 67 NEB.
L. REv. 7, 10 (1988) ("The consequence is foreseeable, if not inevitable; if collective
bargaining does not protect the [weaker party], the law .... either through the courts or
the legislatures, will become the guardian. Labor law is now in the midst of that changing of the guard.") [hereinafter Summers, Labor Law]; Clyde Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures,and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 BUFF. L. REv. 9, 17 (1982) [hereinafter
Summers, Past Premises].
215
Summers, Past Premises, supra note 214.
216 For an extended discussion of this issue, see Stephen Schlossberg & Steven M.
Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation, 37 LAB. LJ. 595

(1986).
217
Section 8(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer to "dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it .. " National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)
(1988). In Section 2(5), Congress provided a broad definition of the term "labor organization," to include "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan" that deals with management concerning "grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988). An employee committee is not illegal if
it only exists for the purpose of providing a means of communication between the representatives and the employees. Such a committee becomes a labor organization under
Section 2(5) when the employee members communicate in a representative capacity regarding mandatory bargaining subjects such as grievances and working conditions.
The legality of using employee involvement committees in a non-union setting is
currently being reviewed by the National Labor Relations Board in Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (1992). In this case, Electromation (the "Company"), set up Action Committees to address serious morale problems arising from the Company's deci-
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is based upon adversarial procedures and relationships. In order
for unions to effectively advance their interests, the NLRA seeks to
secure the union's independence by prohibiting actions that could
result in managerial domination of the union. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits employers from supporting or assisting organizations that
represent workers in discussions over wages, hours, and working
conditions. 218 Firms that establish committees to oversee participatory work programs may violate this prohibition.
Second, uncertainty also exists for unionized workers involved
in participatory work programs because the NLRA limits the right to
form unions to employees that lack supervisory duties. 21 9 The
NLRA draws a clear line between "workers" and "supervisors" that
parallels Taylorism's basic separation of "thinkers" from "doers."
The new shopfloor practices, however, blur this distinction by allowing workers to make supervisory decisions regarding discipline,
job assignments, and hiring. Because the NLRA excludes employees who perform a discretionary managerial function from union
representation, unionized workers fear that they may lose their right
sions to change its attendance policy and not give pay increases. The employer selected
Action Committee members from a list of employees who volunteered to participate by
investigating facts, generating ideas, and providing input to management in an advisory
capacity. Management requested that Committee members discuss the issues with their
co-workers; thus, the Action Committee members were expected to serve in a representative capacity.
The NLRB administrative law judge found that the Action Committees were labor
organizations and that Company had unlawfully dominated these Committees. The
Company appealed to the National Labor Relations Board. The National Labor Relations Board asked the parties to specifically address two issues:
(i) At what point does an employee committee lose its protection as
a communication device and become a labor organization?
(ii) What conduct of an employer constitutes domination or interference with the employee committee?
For an overview of this case, see, e.g., Madelyn Carol Squire, Reality or Myth: Participatoy
Programs and Workplace Democracy, STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 1993). By raising these
issues, the Board appeared to be on the verge of formulating a new age of cooperation
in the workplace. Yet many commentators agree that given the facts of the case, the
Board had little choice in finding that the Action Committees constituted a labor organization within the meaning of section 2(5) and that Electromation's conduct constituted
domination in violation of section 8(a)(2).
218
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959), the Supreme Court
held that an employee group "dealing with" issues under the NLRA constitutes a "labor
organization" under 8(a)(2). There has been a growing trend to retreat from the Cabot
Carbon decision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d
288 (6th Cir. 1982) (Committee of workers and managers discussing working conditions
did not constitute "labor organization."); General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232,
1234 (1977).
219
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988) (defining "employee"); 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988) (defining "employer"); 29 U.S.C. § (11) (1988) (defining "supervisor"). See NLRB v.
Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (University professors with great discretion
over administrative issues cannot unionize.).
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to collective bargaining protection if they participate in the firm's
220
employee involvement programs.
For these reasons, the NLRA should be revised to accommodate the growing use of employee involvement committees. 2 2 1 Labor law scholars assert that Section 8(a)(2) should be repealed to
allow firms to develop programs that permit employees to voice
their concerns about the workplace environment and production
methods. In addition, the NLRA should be amended so that unionized employees can retain their right to participate in collective
bargaining.
Although the trend toward employee committees indicates
greater receptivity to employee involvement in workplace governance, these efforts do not provide the worker representation and
collaboration necessary for the success of participatory work programs. First, the continued operation of these programs typically
depends upon the unilateral discretion of management; thus, they
involve a low-risk step that may easily be reversed. Second, managers usually do not relinquish their informational advantage regarding the firm's financial situation and planned innovations. In order
to promote the high level of worker trust required to attain greater
X-efficiency, legal reform is required to compel firms to provide access to information that allows workers to supervise management
and analyze strategic policies. Paul Weiler proposes legislation
along these lines that would establish elected Employee Participation Committees modeled after German Works Councils. 22 2 He
suggests that German Works Councils have successfully responded
to many of the same issues concerning economic and industrial
change that affect the American workplace. 223 Under Weiler's proposal, however, the Employee Participation Committees would not

220 See, e.g., Charles Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-first
Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 644; William Gould, Reflections on Workers' Participation,
Influence, and Power Sharing: The Futureof IndustrialRelations, 58 U. GIN. L. REv. 381, 38384 (1989); Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499 (1988). So far, the Yeshiva case has not been widely
used to deny employees the right to unionize. See, e.g., Anamag, 284 N.L.R.B. 621
(1987) (team leaders still employees under NLRA).
221
See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 196, at 34.
222
Paul Weiler advocates the adoption of employee participation committees by
firms that employ more than twenty-five workers. Id. at 88 (recognizing necessity to
"satisfy the need for meaningful protection and participation in the workplace, rather
than simply to preserve the institutional formats through which those functions have
traditionally been performed"). Some labor scholars such as Karl Klare and Katherine
Stone assert that union presence is necessary to ensure that cooperative programs do
not coopt workers. Klare, Debate, supra note 5, at 68; Stone, supra note 18, at 169-71.
223
Stone, supra note 18, at 172.
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provide workers with a role in board decisionmaking and the ability
to challenge firm policies in a binding way as they do in Germany. 22 4
In contrast, this Article maintains that judicial recourse is necessary for Employee Participation Committees to protect workers
from opportunistic conduct. This reform would allow employees to
sue for breach of directorial fiduciary duties. Although recognizing
directorial fiduciary duties to employees would represent a substantial shift in the law, recent developments in corporate law demonstrate that some precedent exists to support this obligation.
2.

The Legal Model of the Corporation: Movements Away From
Shareholder Supremacy

In the past, shareholder supremacy defined the boundaries
within which most of the debate about corporate governance occurred. The takeover era, however, highlighted the fundamental
conflict between the interests of shareholders and the concerns of
other constituents who rely upon the corporation for their well-being. Courts and legislatures responded to the consequent social
costs by granting directors discretion to consider nonshareholder
constituents in making strategic decisions. 2 25 These developments
aid directors in preventing changes in control that offer shareholders large premiums, but threaten the nonshareholders' investments
in the firm.
This shift in corporate law is illustrated in ParamountCommunications, Inc. v. Time Inc. 2 2 6 In this case, after Time and Warner agreed
to merge, Paramount announced a tender offer for Time. The Time
board favored the Warner merger, viewing the Paramount bid as a
threat to Time's corporate culture of editorial independence and
journalistic integrity. Time and Warner restructured their transaction to block the Paramount proposal. The Delaware Supreme
Court stated that Time did not place itself on the auction block
merely by pursuing its long-term business strategy to merge with
Warner. 2 27 Thus, the Paramount case came close to explicitly sanc224

Weiler does not give much priority to the "empty promise" of codetermination.

supra note 196, at 220. He states, "lodging essentially unilateral control in
management is not a recipe for exploitation." Id. at 217.
225
See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, The DelawareJudiciaryand the Meaning of CorporateLife and
CorporateLaw, 68 TEx. L. REV. 865 (1990); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the
Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1990).
226
571 A.2d 1140, 1151-52 (Del. 1989).
227
571 A.2d at 1153. For further discussion of this case, see Lyman Johnson &
David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAw. 2105 (1990). Many cases decided during the takeover era illustrate how the legal model of the firm is changing to consider
employee concerns. For example, in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559
A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989), the special employee relationship elements led the Court to
sustain the use of an employee stock option plan (ESOP) to prevent a takeover. In ShamWEILER,
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tioning the "just say no" defense. It established that directors have
no duty to maximize the shareholders' short-term value and that directors may take into account the interests of other constituents
2 28
when making decisions.
State legislatures enacted antitakeover statutes in response to
concerns that nonshareholder constituents need protection from
corporate restructuring. Specifically, over one-half of the states
adopted such statutes designed to broaden directors' discretion to
resist takeovers by considering the interests of employees, suppliers,
customers, and other nonshareholder constituents. 2 29 With one exception, the stakeholder statutes are permissive; that is, they do not
compel directors to address the needs of nonshareholder constiturock, the court held that an ESOP funded through wage concessions was "shareholder
neutral." This led the court to lower the degree of scrutiny in reviewing the board action surrounding the defensive tactic. Id. at 275 76.
In Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075CK, 1993 WL 132385 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), Washtenaw County Judge Donald Shelton ordered General Motors to keep its Willow Run plant open based upon promissory estoppel. Judge Shelton
found that General Motors made statements that it would keep the plant open if
"favorable market demand" justified it. In reliance upon these statements, the Township of Ypsilanti gave $1.3 billion in tax abatements to General Motors. Judge Shelton
stated:
Industry is a source of many of the jobs in our nation and it may well
be that our nation needs a new relationship of trust and cooperation between government and industry in order to compete with heavily subsidized industries from other ... countries. But such an effort must be
national in scope and must be a real partnership with industry, not one in
which industry simply views government as ... another opportunity to
increase profits.... This tax subsidy policy results in pitting state against
state and municipality against municipality in an inter-governmental bidding war. The local governments of this State are placed in a position
where they feel that they have no choice but to give taxpayers' resources
away under a statute which does not mandate that they receive anything
in return for those forgone taxes. Moreover, it has been recognized by
reputable economics scholars for over ten years that the tax subsidy program, at least as adopted in Michigan, simply does not work and has little
if any effect on industry investment or location decisions.
Id. at 21-22.
In another case, the District Court of New Jersey allowed an innovative claim
against a raider by workers who lost their jobs as a result of the use of defensive leveraging; the employees brought suit on the basis that the raider tortiously interfered with
their employment contract. Glass Molders, Putty, Plastics, and Allied Workers Int'l
Union v. Wickes Co., 707 F. Supp. 174, 179-80 (D. N.J. 1989). For a discussion of the
Glass Molders case, see Allan Kanner, Protecting Workers From Unlawful Interference With Their
Jobs, 10 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 171 (1992). Outside the takeover context, the Delaware
Chancery Court recently indicated that directors may consider "the best interests" of
the corporation, rather than just the shareholders' interests once the corporation
reaches the "vicinity of insolvency." Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33 n.55.
228
571 A.2d at 1153.
229
For extensive treatment of these statutes see Symposium: CorporateMalaise-Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1991); see also Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: InterpretingCorporate Consistency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 701 (1992).
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ents. To date, the courts have not interpreted the scope of these
provisions. Although takeover activity has decreased, this legislation may have a profound impact upon corporate law because most
of the statutes are worded broadly to encompass any business
decision.
This review ofjudicial and legislative responses to the takeover
era demonstrates that corporate law is undergoing significant paradigmatic changes. 23 0 Allowing directors to consider employee interests in corporate restructuring significantly alters the legal model
of the corporation. In the past, corporate law did not concern itself
with the needs of various nonshareholder constituencies because
contract law, rather than fiduciary duty, determined management's
obligations to these groups. The courts and legislatures have not
explicitly stated the basis for expanding directorial responsibilities
to nonshareholder constituents. Employees, however, are the constituent mentioned most often in discussions concerning directors'
duties to nonshareholders. Similar to recent inroads upon the employment-at-will doctrine, 23 ' the shift in corporate law may reflect
social values that are more receptive to recognizing that employees

230

Jeffrey Gordon notes that "the Paramount decision portends a change in the

socio-legal culture of corporate law." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations,Markets, and Courts,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1933 (1991). He continues:
Certainly in the constitutional realm courts have become comfortable
with the idea that their decisions gain legitimacy from an emerging social
consensus and properly play a role in shaping that consensus as well as
heralding it.... Yet, unlike constitutional law, the shaping of corporate
law has seemed a more technical enterprise, removed from broad social
impulses.
Id at 1981 (footnote omitted). Gordon concludes that "Paramount can best be understood as ajudgment that a self-regulating market such as an unbridled market in corporate control, threatens fundamental social values such as loyalty, continuity, and
community, and, that at the very least, takeover activity needed to be slowed down." Id
at 1933; see also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE LJ. 201, 252 (noting
that the Time decision acknowledges the public significance of corporate activity).
231
For the most part, the current exceptions to employment at-will do not provide a
remedy for opportunistic breach of an implicit contract. Yet, there is some movement in
this direction. Regardless of the employer's formal or express intention, it is sufficient
for some courts that a worker draw inferences of an implied contract of employment
from the employer's statements or behavior. For example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980), the court stated that, in establishing
personnel policies and practices: "The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and
loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and
the conviction that he will be treated fairly." The court found that reliance upon statements in an employees' manual gives workers a cause of action. Id. at 885.
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977), the employer fired a salesman to avoid paying a large commission bonus under the employment contract, representing a clear attempt by the firm to appropriate the employee's
wages. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court supplied a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into Fowler's employment contract, and awarded him his bonus. Id at
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make significant investments in the firm that depend upon how directors manage the corporation's affairs.
Although these changes in corporate law reflect a greater concern for nonshareholder constituents, they are inadequate because
employees do lack the right to challenge decisions made on their
behalf. For this reason, some corporate scholars assert that courts
should provide nonshareholder constituents with standing to sue
for breach of directorial fiduciary duties. 23 2 In their proposals for
reform, these commentators also include nonshareholder constitu1255-56. So far, however, the courts in Massachusetts have not extended the holding in
Fortune beyond cases of wrongfully withheld commissions.
Explaining the impetus behind these changes in the employment-at-will doctrine,
Clyde Summers states:
Ihe
courts and legislatures have built on an underlying assumption,
more nascent than fully developed, that the employee has a valuable interest in his or her job which ought not be arbitrarily taken away. This
assumption is implicit in the breakdown of the employment at will doctrine, for it is the courts' sense of that valuable interest which spurs them
to develop legal theories which will provide protection.
Summers, Labor Law, supra note 214, at 15.
232
Recently, several commentators have proposed models that include standards
for assigning weights to the interests of various constituents. Some of these models do
not grant nonshareholders standing to sue. For example, Morey McDaniel asserts that
directors should act as bargaining agents for stakeholders as well as shareholders.
Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 SvnrsoN L. REv. 121 (1991). His
model replaces the single goal of shareholder wealth maximization with the dual goal of
"maximiz[ing] stockholder gain" while "minimiz[ing] stakeholder loss." Id. at 137. In
pursuing this dual goal, McDaniel recommends three guidelines. First, the board should
reject any proposal where stakeholders lose more than shareholders gain. Id. at 131-32.
Second, if shareholders gain more in a transaction than stakeholders lose, directors
should ensure that stakeholders are compensated. Id. at 132-33. Finally, under the
most controversial proposal, directors may allow stakeholders to share in the gain beyond any compensation for loss, because stakeholders also bear residual risk. Id. at 13536. However, any benefits awarded to stakeholders must bear a reasonable relationship
to the benefits received by shareholders. Under another model, Stephen Bainbridge
argues that Unocal provides an appropriate framework for applying the nonshareholder
constituency statutes to all structural decisions. Stephen Bainbridge, Interpreting NonshareholderConstituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 971 (1992).
Other commentators have formulated models that provide nonshareholder constituents with standing to sue. David Millon recommends three standards to guide directors. Millon, supra note 5, at 265-68. First, directors should not seek short-term
shareholder gain if such action will harm legitimate nonshareholder investments. Id. at
266. Second, directors should "harmonize the shareholders' financial interest and nonshareholder interests in stable relationships with the corporation." Id. at 267. Finally,
"management should honor the legitimate expectations of nonshareholder constituencies if abrogation of existing relationships is necessary to serve the larger interests of the
corporate enterprise as a whole." Id. at 268.
Professor Lawrence Mitchell advocates that courts use the close corporation test to
balance conflicting interests. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoreticaland PracticalFramework
for EnforcingCorporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tax. L. Rxv. 379 (1992). That is, after nonshareholder constituents prove injury, the board should bear the burden of demonstrating a legitimate corporate purpose. Id. at 636. Then, nonshareholder constituents
should be allowed to prove that an alternative less harmful to their investments existed
for the board to pursue. Id.
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ents other than employees such as customers, bondholders, suppliers, and the local community. In contrast, I focus on nonmanagerial
employees because they are the most vulnerable constituents and
they have the most direct relationship with the corporation. In addition, an adverse impact on employees tends to have a similar impact
on other nonshareholder constituents who rely on the corporation.
I have relied upon the stakeholder statutes, as well as general fiduciary principles, to argue that directors should owe a fiduciary duty to
provide adequate severance pay, job retraining, and other benefits
to dislocated workers in plant closings and layoffs. 23 3 In the next
section, I expand upon this work by exploring how the neutral referee model may facilitate adjustments that are necessary for American firms to respond to global market pressures.
B.

Proposal to Reform the Legal Model of the Corporation to
Recognize Employees' Stake in the Firm
1. DirectorialFiduciary Duties to Employees
a. Fostering Trust in the Workplace

Fiduciary law best transforms the gift-exchange aspects of implicit employment agreements into the language of the law because
the heavy moral overtones of fiduciary obligation encompass the
spirit of mutual respect, solidarity, and confidence that arise in the
workplace. Fiduciary law would protect these noncontractual expectations because this doctrine imposes a higher standard of conduct
than that customarily accepted by the marketplace under the contractual duty of good faith. 23 4 In this way, fiduciary law would encourage employee trust and reliance upon the new implicit
employment agreements under participatory work programs.
Fiduciary doctrine would facilitate participatory work programs
because this doctrine would reflect the notion that trust in the employment relationship is fragile. If firms fail to abide by the terms of
the gift exchange, cooperation may quickly unravel in the absence of
the stabilizing influence of fiduciary duty. Under the existing legal
regime, workers and managers may fail to develop a high degree of
mutual trust because the law, and the cultural practices it makes
possible, habituate the parties to certain ways of viewing their association. Whereas fiduciary duties have a tendency to foster stable
patterns of cooperation, the lower duty of good faith that governs
at-will employment may reinforce the counterpatterns of exploita233
Marleen
a Fiduciary Duty
234 See, e.g.,
1988 DuKE L.J.

A. O'Connor, Restructuringthe Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing
to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991).
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
879 (company obligations under contractual and fiduciary duties).
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don and conflict. Legally acknowledging that employees are mem-

bers of the firm through corporate law may reshape this
conditioning of preferences; the new fiduciary duty would symbolize
that workers and shareholders are partners in the enterprise who
have common interests in increasing the internal efficiency of the
firm. Viewed in this light, fiduciary law provides a loyalty filter that
would serve a preference-shaping function by encouraging the parties to build ties of affection and loyalty that are needed to overcome
the prisoners' dilemma problem inherent in the productivity
28 5

game.
More specifically, fiduciary law would facilitate participatory
work programs because the possibility of legal sanctions would provide some assurance to employees who are uncertain about whether
to trust managers. 23 6 Indeed, the very existence ofjudicial recourse
for breach of fiduciary duty may deter opportunistic behavior by
firms. 23 7 By reducing the risks of trust, fiduciary law would provide
support for cooperative corporate cultures by allowing employees
to rely upon systems trust.2 8 This systems trust would signal that in
the future, the parties' relationship will be based on mutually beneficial understanding and flexibility rather than on strict adherence to
legal rights and contract terms. 23 9 Accordingly, fiduciary doctrine
would preserve the atmosphere of good will in the workplace and
thus better enable managers and workers to adjust to external mar24 0
ket pressures.
In contrast, Williamson warns that the adversarial atmosphere
of a courtroom is detrimental to the quality of the employment rela235

For a general discussion of the role of the law as a preference-shaping institu-

tion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U.

CHi. L. REv.

1129 (1986) (changing preferences reflect the moral function of the law).
236 Cf. BARBER, supra note 129, at 23 ("[Tlrust is weakened if those who have become
justifiably distrustful have no recourse to the law and its controls.").
237 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165, 1228 (1990) ("The Ojudicial role] expresses a societal recognition
that fair treatment in business relationships is both an important and desirable value.
The shift from telling parties to look out for themselves to encouraging cooperative
efforts ought to inspire management to a higher level of behavior."); G. Richard Shell,
Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiationof Commercial Contracts: Toward a New CauseofAction,
44 V~AND. L. REv. 221 (1991) (discussing role of law in promoting trust).
238
Bratton, supra note 131; ef. J.A.G. Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in
Close Corporations, 1972 DuKE L.J. 921, 946 ("[The] imprecise concept of fiduciary responsibility, at least as applied to majority shareholders ... has clearly promoted fair
dealing within business enterprises.").
239
Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (the willingness of the parties to cooperate is derived from their
desire to preserve commercial relationships and to avoid damage to their business
reputations).
240
See generally LAN MAcNEIL, THE NEw SocIAL CoNTRAcT (1983).
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tionship.2 4 1 Williamson raises an important point because "trust
cannot be reduced to trust in the law and in the sanctions which the
law makes possible. ' 24 2 Otherwise, managers would act out of fear
2 43
of legal sanctions and not from the emotional feelings of trust.
Although to a certain extent the signals needed to start a trusting
relationship are weakened by fiduciary obligation, these signals
would retain sufficient force to promote the trust-building process
in the employment context.2 4 4 Even though fiduciary law would
provide protection from opportunistic conduct by firms, the need
for employee trust remains because fiduciary obligation would not
fully compensate all breaches of trust. Because of the substantial
discretion and power entrusted to the fiduciary, and the consequent
difficulty of detecting fiduciary breach, fiduciary duties must be
somewhat self-enforcing.2 45 Fiduciary law promotes this self-enforcement by using a language of moral obligations that would provide incentives for directors to act ethically and to assume greater
awareness of and respect for the needs of workers.
The signals for trust provided by fiduciary law will not be effective if managers attempt to use them in an instrumental manner just
to increase efficiency. Under the neutral referee model, the most
effective managers will be those that are committed in their minds
and hearts to recognizing that employee participation in workplace
governance is valuable because it achieves human values by enhancing worker dignity.2 46 In short, fiduciary obligations to employees
enable managers to increase the internal efficiency of the firm
through their own genuine feelings of trust and acceptance of
corporatism.
Fiduciary duty would foster cooperative labor relations because
the development of trust requires that the calculation regarding the
impact of legal rules upon the relationship remains latent. For this
reason, the atmosphere of trust is destroyed when managers and
workers engage in extensive collective bargaining negotiations that
produce 500 page documents because it puts workers and managers
on their guard by making them suspicious of the motives of the
other. In contrast, the Saturn project agreement between General
241

Williamson, supra note 19, at 256 ("Adjudicatory review of the decisions of cer-

tain institutions, while perhaps insuring a 'better' decision in some objective sense, can
only disrupt on-going relationships within the institution and thereby hamper the institution's ability to serve its designated societal function." (quotingJustice Rehnquist, Address at the University of Miami School of Law (Feb. 2, 1978)).
242
LUHMANN, supra note 129, at 35.
243 Id. at 34.
244
245

Id. at 35-36.

Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 830 (1983) (observing the

fiduciary law encourages "altruistic and moral behavior").
246
See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Motors and the United Auto Workers consists of only 20 pages,
which clarify their mutual goals in establishing an employee participation committee to govern their relationship. 24 7 Fiduciary law
would provide protection to workers who rely upon these types of
documents without destroying the energizing atmosphere of trust
that emerges when embarking upon a new approach to labor relations. In these situations, fiduciary obligations to workers would
serve as a back-up system seldom used actively, but always used
248
passively.
Indeed, legal regulation appears to have had this type of positive influence in Germany where the employment relationship is
perceived not so much as one of confrontation between workers and
management, but one of encompassing workers as members in the
enterprise. 24 9 In contrast to the adversarial approach of collective
bargaining that exists in the United States, German Works Council
relations adopt a different perspective that is expressed in Section 2
of the Works Constitution Act: "The employer and the works council shall work together in a spirit of mutual trust ...for the good of
the employees and of the establishment." 2 50 This cooperative atmosphere is also reflected in Section 74, which directs that workers
and managers "shall discuss the matters at issue with an earnest desire to reach agreement and make suggestions for settling their
25
differences." '
This analysis of the role that fiduciary duty would play in fostering trust in the workplace provides the foundation for a broader
evaluation of the neutral referee model. Under the referee model,
the most successful directors will win the trust and acceptance of
both employees and shareholders in their role as mediators. Conventions that facilitate this acceptance could arise, in part, through
the development of legal standards that provide guiding principles
for the board to use in striking a balance between the interests of
employees and shareholders. 2 52 Thus, the next section continues to
explore the use of fiduciary law to regulate the employment relationship by examining the legal standard that would govern the directors' obligation to protect employees from opportunistic conduct
by firms.
supra note 196, at 36-37.
Macaulay, supra note 239 (parties in long-term business relationships chose to
litigate only when reputational sanctions fail, usually in situations involving high stakes
or the termination of the relationship).
249
Summers, supra note 170, at 370.
250
The Works Constitution Act of 1972 § 2.
251
Id. § 74.
252
Aoki, supra note 50, at 18-22.
247
248
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The Legal Standard Governing the Directors' Obligation to
Protect Employees From Opportunistic Conduct

Many American directors currently view their role as balancing
the interests of employees and shareholders, but not as neutral arbiters. 2 53 When the shareholders' and employees' interests directly
conflict in situations like plant closings and layoffs, studies indicate
that directors refrain from expressing their moral sentiments about
employees due to their belief that they have a legal obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth. 254 By absolving directors from their
responsibility to act as moral agents, the current legal regime promotes an end-game problem that threatens collaboration in the employment relationship. The neutral referee model would remedy
this end-game problem by ensuring that firms do not defect during
the last round of the productivity game. A legal standard is needed
that both shields the shareholders from managerial self-interest and
prevents the expropriation of the employees' firm-specific
investments.
Other areas of the law can provide useful analogies in formulating this legal standard. Similar situations arise when courts review
directors' decisions to engage in transactions that may benefit the
majority stockholders at the expense of the minority stockholders
and when they examine trustees' decisions to allocate investment
proceeds among beneficiaries. In these situations, courts use a fairness test that requires substantive review to ensure that the beneficiaries's expectations are not defeated. 255 Courts consider the
whole relationship to determine whether the fiduciary has fulfilled
its duty to the competing beneficiaries. For example, in the trust
context, courts evaluate the trustee's decision to allocate trust funds
between beneficiaries according to the primary duty to conserve the
trust property. In a similar way, the neutral referee's decisions
should be governed by an overall duty to maximize X-efficiency by
minimizing the negative impact that strategic decisions have upon
employees.
Most commentators reject the neutral referee model by assuming that directors cannot serve two masters and that courts will simply defer to the directors' business judgment. True, a standard
253
Nesteruk, supra note 151, at 93 (citingJAY LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS
OR POTNrATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989)); see also Larry

0. Soderquist & Robert P. Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and CorporateResponsibility: New GuidelinesforManagement, 1978 DUKE LJ. 819 (stating that stockholders also
see directors' role as encompassing interests of nonshareholder constituents).
254
Nesteruk, supra note 151, at 93.
255
D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 56-58 (1977) (general discussion of competing
beneficiaries); HODGE O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 120-23 (2d ed.
1992).
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requiring directors to balance the claims of employees and shareholders is not as easy to visualize as the shareholder wealth max-

imization objective. Yet, directors of worker cooperatives,
employee-owned firms, and codetermined firms must also face the

real world problems of integrating the conflicting concerns of employees and shareholders. 256 A greater understanding of these alternative systems of corporate governance will further develop the
257
neutral referee model.

Other commentators claim that because implicit agreements

are not verifiable to third parties such as courts, this lack of verifiability prevents legal enforcement of these arrangements. 258 Unfortunately, the terms of implicit agreements are not well-defined.

If they were, employees could sue to enforce them as implied contracts. 2 59 Yet, most fiduciary relationships involve implicit agree-

ments; the fact that the terms are not explicit does not prevent
courts from protecting the beneficiaries from opportunistic conduct. 26 0 This is because courts uphold the norms and conventions
26 1
that develop during the history of the underlying relationship.

German directors are charged by law to carry out their responsibilities in the
256
"interests of the company." Aktiengesetz § 93 (1965).
257
Unfortunately, however, little data exists concerning how directors balance competing interests in these firms.
258
KIEps, supra note 79, at 110; Carl Shapiro &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker DisciplineDevice, 74 AM. EcON. R-v. 433, 442 (1984).
259 Joseph Singer has proposed the use of "a reliance interest in property" to protect employees in plant closings. He asserts:
It matters very little whether the reliance interest in property is conceptualized as a doctrine of property law, contracts, torts, trusts, labor law,
corporate law, or anything else. The divisions between these areas of the
law exist merely for convenience, and it seems that rigid categorization
hampers analysis. A more unified analysis of entitlements is useful, as the
law and economics writers have convincingly demonstrated.
Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 614, 700 n.309 (1988); see
also Jay M. Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A HistoricalPerspective, 1984 Wis. L. REv.
1373, 1389 (extending reliance doctrine to grant employees rights in the workplace).
260 Courts often use fiduciary duty to prevent inequitable conduct that seems permissible under the explicit terms of a contract or statute. Many close corporation cases
reveal that the fiduciary duty notion can be used to avoid the explicit terms of a contract.
Most notably, Judge Easterbrook has stated that all contracts contain an implied fiduciary term that neither side will behave opportunistically. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815
F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). Judge Easterbrook implied that a narrow fiduciary duty arises from the employment at-will arrangement. The
court found a duty to disclose based upon an implied fiduciary duty to refrain from
opportunistically buying back stock. See also Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (invoking use fiduciary duty to prevent partner from using power to terminate at-will partnership to expropriate gains); Topper v. Park Sherwood Pharmacy, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (protecting at-will employee/shareholder in dose corporation context
by invoking fiduciary duty).
261

Id.
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Thus, fiduciary law reflects the changing nature of the employees'
2 62
investments in the firm.
The vague moral duties in fiduciary law would allow the specific
obligations to employees to be formulated on a case-by-case basis
and provide the courts with discretion to tailor relief to the particular situation. 263 Perhaps the most serious practical difficulty courts
would face is determining the amount of compensation necessary to
make employees whole for their firm-specific investments after plant
closings and layoffs. Although precise measurement may not be
possible, these problems are not insurmountable. Analogies may be
drawn to age discrimination litigation that has developed the concept of "front pay." This remedy reflects the notion of implicit employment agreements because it compensates workers for losing the
future value of their investments in the firm and having to begin
their career again at the bottom of the job ladder with a new employer.2 64 Another option would be to enact statutory safeharbors
that establish minimum rights for workers. For example, a satisfactory solution would include the right to substantial severance pay
scaled according to length of service. 26 5 Such safeharbors would
ease the implementation of the neutral referee model by providing
directors with guidelines, while concurrently permitting judicial expansion of the directors' duty not to engage in opportunistic
conduct.
Although the transition to the neutral referee model would incur organizational and societal costs, the success of the German system in integrating the employees' voice in corporate governance
suggests that substantial X-efficiency advantages would be obtained
in the long-run. The next section continues to explore these inter262
Bratton, supra note 131 (fiduciary duty is not "alien morality imposed on business people by the state").
263
This proposal represents a marked departure from the conventional method of
regulating corporate behavior; the traditional method calls for complex and detailed
legislation. Corporate scholars favoring internal reform over external regulation argue
that if the corporations' institutional structure remains unchanged, the reasons prompt-

ing government regulation may lead to more regulation.

RALPH NADER

ET

AL., TAmING

THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); Alfred Conard, Reflections of the Public
Interest Director, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977).
264
Cf. WEILER, supra note 196, at 248 (recommending this remedy be used to com-

pensate victims of unfair labor practices under the NLRA). For an expanded discussion
of front pay, see, e.g., Brian S. Felton,Jury Computationof Front Pay Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 76 MINN. L. REV. 985 (1992) (arguing that courts should allow
juries to calculate front pay).
265
Massachusetts enacted a statute, the first of its kind in the nation, which provides
that any employee terminated within two years after a change in corporate control is
eligible for a lump sum payment equal to twice the employee's weekly compensation,
times the number of years of service. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 183(b) (1988). This
statute, however, only applies to takeover-related job loss.
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nal efficiency aspects by examining how the neutral referee model
attains the advantages of the German system.
2.

The Neutral Referee Model: A Variation on Codetermination

The neutral referee model resembles the German system of
codetermination by granting participation rights in recognition of
the employees' investments of human capital. Yet, similar to the
German system, workers' firm-specific investments would not entitle
them to a direct portion of residual earnings of the firm. Although
workers would not have the right to attend board meetings, the neutral referee model offers workers indirect worker participation at the
board level by altering the way that directors balance the interests of
shareholders and employees. The neutral referee model also parallels the German system because this governance structure would include Employee Participation Committees that require managers to
2 66
provide information and consult with employees.
a.

The Duty to Disclose Information to Employees

The neutral referee model requires directors to inform employees about issues traditionally categorized as managerial prerogatives. Fiduciary law is an appropriate mechanism to facilitate this
aspect of the neutral referee model because disclosure is a prominent feature of fiduciary doctrine. 2 6 7 Disclosure obligations would
reflect the need for managers and workers to develop openness and
honesty with one another, rather than attitudes of skepticism and
268
distrust that currently prevail in the workplace.
Because this new model of corporate governance seeks to make
workers and shareholders partners in the enterprise, it is appropriate to turn to the Uniform Partnership Act to develop standards for
disclosure to employees. Under the Uniform Partnership Act, partners must render "on demand" full information concerning partnership affairs. 26 9 Access to the partnership books is one aspect of
the partners' overriding duty to share information. In some situa266
Smooth mediation and representation of diverse interest among employees by a
single representative body for employees is crucial. Aoki, supra note 50, at 16-22. This
single representative body must accommodate the most heterogeneous workforce that
has ever existed in this country. WEILER, supra note 196, at 5-6.
267
In general, parties have no duty to disclose in arms length bargaining. This rule,
however, is changing. See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (imposing
duty to disclose on sale of residence).
268
ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 6:63 (1991).
269
Section 20 states: "Partners shall render on demand true and full information of
all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of any deceased partner or partner under legal disability." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 20. As to
the duty owed by agents and trustees, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173.
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tions, courts have held that this duty is breached by a failure to make
affirmative disclosure even in the absence of an explicit demand. In
general, no demand is required if the circumstnces indicate that
the party entitled to disclosure is relying on the other party to volunteer it. The extent of this broader duty to disclose depends on
several factors, such as the parties' access to financial records,
whether the nondisclosing partner managed the business and thus
was familiar with the relevant information, and whether the party to
whom the duty of disclosure is owed had the requisite knowledge or
2 70
expertise to protect herself.
By analogy, directors should be required to provide employees
with regular and detailed information about the firm's personnel
policies and the broader financial condition of the firm. 27 1 Workers
would also have the right to demand any additional information
necessary to evaluate issues pertaining to working conditions and
job security. In order to obtain the X-efficiency benefits from enhanced communication within the firm, the neutral referee model
would establish Employee Participation Committees that could evaluate this information and consult with managers about strategic policies of the firm.
b.

Employee ParticipationCommittees

Under the neutral referee model, Employee Participation Committees would consult regularly with management about decisions
concerning the general economic condition of the firm. These strategic decisions would focus primarily upon employment issues such
as compensation, hiring and training, technological innovations,
work assignments, and layoffs and work reassignments.
These types of representative bodies would permit managers to
take full advantage of the knowledge and skills of the workforce by
allowing discussion of problems as they unfold. In addition,
through continual communication and negotiation, representatives
of labor and management may come to trust and cooperate with
each other to a much greater degree. Indeed, Works Councils in
Germany have demonstrated the capacity to reduce substantially the
conflicts that arise during industrial transition. Because fiduciary
law would provide judicial recourse for employees, and firms will try
to avoid litigation, there is reason to believe that this consultation
will be effective. That is, directors are not likely to make any impor270
271

BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 268, § 6:64.

Leslie K. Sheldin, Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and FinancialData and the Impact on the American System of Labor-ManagementRelations, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 441 (1980) (discussing how to create greater labor-management cooperation through disclosure).
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tant strategic decisions without first considering the possible reactions of the Employee Participation Committee. 272
Employee Participation Committees, as well as traditional unions, would also aid employee efforts to exercise their rights as beneficiaries of the new fiduciary obligations. Many commentators are
concerned that providing employees with additional legal rights will
produce a flood of litigation. 273 In contrast, Paul Weiler emphasizes
the limited uses and value of the labor law in the workplace. Weiler
explains that the employees' ability to detect and complain about
violations of their rights depends on their widely varying intellectual, financial, and organizational resources. 274 Thus, Employee
Participation Committees are necessary to give employees a better
chance to take advantage of their legal rights by providing financial
support and counseling. In this way, these committees would improve the likelihood that the broader goals of the neutral referee
model would be achieved.
3. The Advantages of the Neutral Referee Model Over German
Codetermination
The neutral referee model not only accomplishes the same
goals as the German system of codetermination, it also may offer
two advantages. First, codetermination involves a potential threat
that industrial conflict at the board level could seriously impede the
process of directorial decisionmaking. In contrast, the neutral
model may provide a more efficient institutional device to resolve
the competing claims of employees and shareholders. In analyzing
employee-owned firms, Henry Hansmann suggests that "fiduciary
mechanisms may generally be a more effective substitute for the
market than are political institutions: Firms managedfor their workers, it appears, often perform better than firms managed by their
workers." 275 Game theory also suggests that the neutral referee
model may reduce the potential for adversarial behavior because the
board can make rational group decisions rather than allowing the
272
273

supra note 50, at 18-22.
Alfred Conard asks:
Why, then should not employees... be permitted to maintain derivative
suit? There does not seem to be any very good reason for giving them
less rights than shareholders. The real reason for withholding the derivative suit from employees is probably a belief that derivative and class suits
are often abused, and that broadening the right to sue would broaden the
abuses.
Aoki,

ALFRED CONARD, CORPORATONS IN PERSPECTIVE 405 (1978).

274 WE LER, supra note 196, at 28-29 (noting that wrongful dismissals are usually
filed by professional employees rather than unskilled workers).
275 Hansmann, supra note 176, at 1816.
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outcome to depend on the self-interested decisions of the two com76
peting groups.2
The neutral referee model not only resolves competing claims
in a more efficient manner but also may be more politically acceptable than reform proposals for codetermination. Codetermination
may not necessarily be transferable to this country where different
ideas of labor-management relations prevail. 277 In the past, the
strong aversion of employers to worker participation in basic entrepreneurial decisions precluded much discussion about
codetermination. In contrast, the neutral referee proposal draws
upon existing managerial customs and conventions in the United
States. In addition, the neutral referee model builds upon recent
legal changes in directorial fiduciary responsibilities of the takeover
era. Also, given the anti-union sentiment that pervades in the business community and the growing interest in employee involvement
committees, these proposals may be more favorably received than
attempts to reform collective bargaining. 278
The neutral referee model would promote evolution in the positions and attitudes of managers and workers by allowing the process of reform to build upon existing business practices and
276
Aoki, supra note 50, at 18-22. Hansmann suggests that the fiduciary duty that
governs these plans should be viewed as an alternative to the market and political methods of making social choices. Hansmann, supra note 176, at 1816. Bruce Chapman has
extended this analysis suggesting that the fiduciary mechanism operates as a solution to
prevent inefficient cycling in the context of directorial fulfilling duties to competing beneficiaries. Chapman, supra note 130. He explains the "restricted voice" used by Gordon
and Hansmann as a method of securing a "structure induced" equilibrium against political cycling, so "restricted exit" needs to be used to ensure that there is no contractual
cycling. Id.
Hansmann suggests that extreme forms of devices to reduce conflict can be found
in those firms in which the board consists of outsiders who are self-appointing and not
removable except for cause. In these situations, the board is charged with managing the
firm as fiduciaries on behalf of the workers rather than being elected by them. He cites
as examples the "worker cooperatives" in Britain and Weirton Steel Company. Henry
Hansmann, Worker Participationand Corporate Governance, U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming
1993). Lawrence Mitchell has proposed a similar solution in reforming the directors'
fiduciary duties to encompass obligations to nonshareholder constituents. Lawrence
Mitchell, A CriticalLook at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992). He suggests creating an independent board that is a self-perpetuating body. Under this proposal, various corporate constituents would be given the right to sue to remove directors
for cause. Id.
277
Ronald M. Sharp, Codetermination: A Postmortem, 40 LAB. LJ. 323, 333 (1989)
("[C]odetermination is not about to sweep industrial relations in this country."); KIM
MOODY, AN INJURY TO ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM 191 (1988) (arguing
that cooperation will not lead to codetermination because of socialist tradition and powerful unions in European countries).
278
Because labor law reform is intensely controversial, Weiler suggests that political
realism requires workers to invest their limited political leverage where it will have the
highest payoff. WEILER, supra note 196, at 228. Yet, he "give[s] comparatively litde
political priority" to "empty promise" of codetermination. Id. at 297-98.
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theories. In the future, workers may gain political leverage as economic pressures induce new openness to ideas that have not commanded support in the past.2 79 Thus, in time, the neutral referee
proposal may lead to additional measures that would advance workplace democracy.2 80
CONCLUSION

Responding to the demands of an international marketplace,
firms have adopted new shopfloor practices that depend on worker's
communicating crucial knowledge. As Robert Reich explains: "our
economic future must be rooted in the only resource that will remain uniquely American: Americans themselves." 28 1 Yet, the
changing practices on the shopfloor present a prisoners' dilemma:
although these programs present an opportunity for workers and
firms to profit mutually, the atmosphere of mistrust that prevails in
the workplace increases the potential for mutual loss. The capacity
to overcome this prisoners' dilemma will depend partly upon the
availability of alternative organizational structures that promote cooperative corporate cultures. Thus, the United States faces a cultural challenge to create organizational devices that encourage
collaboration and prevent exploitation. This Article has presented
an alterative model of corporate governance that revises directorial
fiduciary duties to promote a high level of employee trust and
commitment.
To expand worker influence inside the firm in a manner that
enhances X-efficiency, this Article maintains that the reconstruction
of corporate law must accompany the reconstruction of labor law.
This period of transformation in the workplace suggests that labor
law and corporate law scholars should seek common understanding
through dialogue concerning viable corporate governance mechanisms to meet the needs of American workers in a global world
economy. Corporate scholars need to rethink traditional solutions
to corporate governance to accommodate the employees' changing
role in the corporate structure. Similarly, labor scholars should begin looking at issues concerning institutional shareholders because
the employees' role in the codetermined firm is only half of the
story.
279
280

Id.

Klare, Debate, supra note 5, at 69 ("It remains to be seen whether cooperation
schemes of the kind now in vogue can act as an entering wedge in a process designed to
achieve genuine power sharing and workplace democratization."). But see Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Visions and Labor's Challenge, 12 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 233, 241 (1990) ("[The current cooperation debate does not create an opening for serious discussion of worker participation.").
281
REICH, supra note 1, at 13.

